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The Naval Postgraduate School is developing a Multilevel Secure Local Area 
Network (MLS LAN) that incorporates commercial-off-the-shelf client workstations to 
provide multiple users with simultaneous secure access to stored data of different 
sensitivity levels. The MLS LAN uses a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) in 
the LAN' s client workstations to extend the TCB from the trusted server across the 
network to these workstations. Connections between elements of the LAN are under TCB 
control and are conducted by way of several new communications protocols. 
Using a realistic System Requirements Document and a High Level Protocol 
Analysis, this thesis presents a framework of communications protocols that will enable 
the components of the MLS LAN to securely interact. The framework first presents a 
communications channel protocol that protects all data transmitted on the network. 
Following this, three other protocols are described that enable MLS LAN users to safely 
login and negotiate a secure session, access Application Protocol Servers that provide 
services such as e-mail or WWW services, and to use typical LAN-based office 
automation services. Finally presented is an analysis of both TLS and IPSec, which 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate and define a communications 
framework for a multilevel secure, high assurance network. To sufficiently define this 
framework, a network security architecture must be proposed. This thesis will, therefore 




Almost all of the organizations in the United States Government and corporate 
America can place information they use and maintain into two distinct categories. The 
first, and probably most widely used, contains documents and data that are considered by 
the originating organization to be "non-proprietary" in nature. Information in this 
category is not regarded to be vital to the security or integrity of the organization's 
productivity and therefore is available to the public for use. The other category contains 
information that is considered to be "proprietary" in nature. These proprietary documents 
contain some information that, if released to their competitors, could cause some level of 
damage to the organization's productivity. The information in the "non-proprietary" 
category could comfortably be assigned a single label of "releasable" or "open to the 
public" as everyone considers all of the information similarly accessible. For proprietary 
information, however, additional label considerations are usually required to delineate the 
specific level of damage that may occur were the information be inadvertently released. 
The most recognized example of this is the military's security classification system. 
Information considered to cause "exceptionally grave damage to the national security" if 
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released is labeled "Top Secret" while information considered to cause only "serious 
damage to the national security" is labeled "Secret" [Ref. 1]. The actual determination of 
what is "grave" or "serious" is based upon the Government's National Security Policy 
and is assigned by the individual or organization that creates the information. While the 
basis for label determination is beyond the scope of this work, it does illustrate the 
necessity for multiple levels of data security within a given organization. 
The question is then, how does the organization provide their authorized users 
access tp both proprietary and non-proprietary labeled information while simultaneously 
ensuring the information's protection? Unfortunately there is no easy answer. Most 
organizations use one of four security modes of operation to accomplish this task. The 
easiest to implement is known as "Dedicated" mode. A dedicated network security 
solution involves the creation of mutually exclusive "stovepipe" networks that are 
configured to handle only a single level of data security. To gain access to a specific 
network each user must be cleared and have a "need to know", or requirement, for all 
information on that network. This solution creates two distinct problems for the 
organization. The first is the requirement to deploy redundant hardware and network 
configurations throughout the organization to support each of the unique data security 
levels. This significantly increases the cost of the organization's information technology 
(IT) structure. The second, and probably more significant, is the duplication of effort in. 
the areas of system administration and infrastructure management. 
A second operational mode is known as "System High". The system high 
solution labels all of the organization's proprietary information to its highest sensitivity 
level. This solution effectively forces everyone to be cleared to the same high level and 
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have a "need to know" for at least some of the information contained on the network. 
This solution does reduce the redundancy in the hardware implementation; however, the 
organization loses much of the security level granularity that most likely was the impetus 
for the security segregation of the information in the first place. This solution also adds 
complexity to the organization's ability to intemperate with other networks. All 
information created on the network, even if it is considered non-proprietary relative to 
another organization, must be transmitted out at "system high". This creates a huge 
problem for the receiving organization in the handling of this new "classified material". 
The third mode of operation typically used is known as the "Compartmented 
Mode". This solution is similar to the "Dedicated Mode". All information and users are 
given the same sensitivity level, but the system provides a number of non-hierarchical 
compartments to confine access and segregate the information. The use of compartments 
allows the organization to grant access to proprietary information, not only on the basis 
of its security value, but also on the user's need to access that specific compartment. 
While this does not alleviate the need for redundant hardware architectures, e.g., the 
organization must still have separate systems for each sensitivity level, it does provide the 
organization with a robust solution for the required security segregation. 
The most versatile, and complex of the operational modes is the "True Multilevel 
Security Mode". This solution enables an organization to maintain a single network that 
is sufficient to verifiably restrict access to only that data for which the user is both cleared 
and has the requirement to see, even though the network contains data at multiple 
sensitivity levels. A true Multilevel Secure (MLS) network can eliminate the 
architectural and administrative redundancy found in the previous solutions while 
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providing a well-defined structure for data sensitivity and data integrity differentiation. 
[Ref. 2] The most profound difficulty with this operational mode is the lack of a 
reasonably priced commercially available MLS network solution in today' s marketplace. 
In 1997, The Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Security and Information 
Security (INFOSEC) Studies and Research (NPS CISR) began to evaluate a possible 
solution for this problem. The research team envisioned the development of a network 
that incorporated the use of a small number of high cost servers, previously verified to 
provide __ high assurance in stand-alone systems, as the foundation for their multilevel 
assurance and protection. The client workstations connecting to the network were 
envisioned as inexpensive, "diskless" personal computers. Access to network information 
would be exclusively controlled by the network's security infrastructure or "Trusted 
Computing Base" that enforced the organization's security policy. The result of this 
vision is a system that is both multilevel secure and reasonably priced. 
Once developed, this network would be suitable for evaluation using a defined 
criterion such as the Department of Defense Trusted Computer Security System 
Evaluation Criteria, DoD 5200.28-STD (TCSEC) [Ref. 3] or its successor, the Common 
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2.1 [Ref. 4]. These 
documents provide standard security criteria for computer systems and specify technical 
methodologies, which can be used to evaluate the system's ability to support the security 
policy. The NPS CISR plan fell squarely into the "Multilevel Secure" class of systems 
that the TCSEC defined as "system[s] containing information with different sensitivities 
that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and need-
to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which they lack 
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authorization." [Ref 3.] From this definition the NPS CISR network plan became known 
as the Multilevel Secure Local Area Network Project or MLS LAN Project. 
2. Project Overview 
Any multilevel networking solution proposed for real world use must provide the 
required functionality, but it must also ensure that the information being secured can only 
be accessed by those users to whom the organization has granted access. This implies 
that the organization must first define a policy concerning access to the system's 
informi;!.tion. Sterne, [Ref. 5], breaks this notion down into three distinct areas. The first 
is the notion of establishing security policy objectives, or the "statement of intent to 
protect an identified resource from unauthorized use". Once this has been defined, the 
organization can develop a "set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an 
organization manages, protects and distributes resources to achieve [these] specified 
security policy objectives". These rules are known as their "Organizational Security 
Policy". From this is developed an "Automated Security Policy" that addresses the set of 
restrictions placed on computing systems to prevent violation of the Organizational 
Security Policy. 
In order to enforce the protection called for in the security policy, the MLS LAN 
solution has to provide a couple of principle guarantees. First, it must be able to maintain 
absolute control over the mechanism that provides the data to the users. This mechanism, 
like a security guard on a vault, cannot be by-passed and must be absolutely trustworthy 
to enforce the rules given by the organization that hired him. In a computer system this 
means that all of the code used in the development of the protection mechanism, and by 
extension, the rest of the security related processes must be tied directly to the 
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enforcement of the security policy. As will be seen, the accepted standard evaluation 
criterion requires the use of formal and informal models of the security policy to create 
this association. In addition the finished processes must be shown to be free of malicious 
or un-validated code. This is no easy task, as the all code must be validated as it is 
written or modified to ensure that the development team has accurately designed the 
process to meet all of the functional, as well as assurance requirements. More 
importantly however, the code must be verified that it does these functions correctly, 
without. subversive entries such as "back doors" or Trojan Horses that could later be used 
to undermine the system's security." Second, the MLS networking solution must 
verifiably ensure the identity and coinciding security factors associated with each user 
accessing the network. The solution must provide the user with the assurance that he is, 
in fact, connecting to the authentic network information he needs. The ability to 
distinctly identify both users and information facilitates the protection mechanism's 
ability to control access to both the network and protect the organization's information 
from uninvited users. 
The MLS LAN Project was developed to provide a trusted network system that is 
both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the above requirements and allow for independent 
evaluation under an accepted standard criterion. Currently, the TCSEC is the Department 
of Defense's principle "metric with which to evaluate the degree of trust that can be 
placed in a computer system for the secure processing of classified and other sensitive 
information" [Ref. 3]. Ratings for computer systems are broken down into four divisions, 
each with internal "Evaluation Class" ratings. 
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Division D describes computer systems that fail to meet the security requirements 
for any of the higher evaluation classes. There are no classes in Division D. Division C 
has two classes and introduces the concept of using a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) to 
enforce "Discretionary Access Control" (DAC). A Trusted Computing Base is an 
abstraction for the collection of elements of a computer system that pertain to the 
organization's security rules or policy. Its aegis encompasses all security-relevant 
aspects of the system, for example, policy enforcement mechanisms, any auditing 
(retriev:~ and analysis), identification and authentication, and the interface for security 
administration. The introduction of DAC allows the system to separate users from 
information on a discretionary "need-to-know" basis. 
Division B has three evaluation classes and, in addition to DAC policy 
enforcement, introduces the concept of Mandatory Access Control (MAC). Mandatory 
access control is designed to maintain separation between different security levels of the 
accessing agent or "subjects" and the files or data to be accessed, known as "objects". To 
accomplish this, "Sensitivity Labels" are assigned to e·ach subject as they are adqed to the 
system and objects as they are created. Disclosure of information to a subject is granted 
based upon a comparison between the subject and object sensitivity labels, e.g., the 
subject's sensitivity label must be equal to or greater than that ofthe requested object 
[Ref. 6]. 
Division B also introduces the requirement for a clearly defined and documented 
security policy model. The security policy model states the policy to be applied using 
either an informal statement (Informal Model) or formal language with proven assertions 
(Formal Model). Previous evaluation Divisions required only a statement of the 
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manufacturer's "philosophy of protection" and how this would be applied to the TCB. 
Another important inclusion is the need to satisfy the requirements of the "Reference 
Monitor" Concept. "The reference monitor enforces security by forcing all subjects (e.g., 
processes and users) who wish to access an object (e.g., files or portions of memory) to 
do so only through the monitor itself. Thus it monitors all references to objects by 
subjects"[Ref. 6]. A depiction of the reference monitor concept is given in figure 1.1. 
The monitor based on a set of rules governing access grants the right to use objects. The 
key, hoy.rever, to the successful use of the reference monitor is that its design must follow 
three specific principles: 
• It "must be tamperproof'. 
• It "must always be invoked". 
• It "must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the 





Figure 1.1 The Reference Monitor Concept 
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.. 
Another significant difference between Division B and Division C is the requirement to 
establish a "Trusted Path" between the user and the Trusted Computing Base. This 
requirement ensures that "communications via this trusted path shall be activated 
exclusively by a user of the TCB and shall be logically isolated and unmistakably 
distinguishable from other paths" [Ref. 3.]. The purpose for this is to assure both the TCB 
and user that they are communicating with each other through an "isolated and 
distinguishable" path. The trusted path can then be safely used for authentication 
operatigns, session renegotiation, or any other security related operations needed between 
the user and the TCB. 
The highest rating provided for by the TCSEC is Division A, which has only one 
evaluation Class, Al. The functional requirements for Class Al rated systems are 
equivalent to Class B3; however, these systems must undergo a much more rigorous and 
extensive regime of formal design specifications, proofs, and verification [Ref. 6]. 
The MLS LAN Project solution is to be designed to satisfy the requirements for a TCSEC 
Class B3 rating. The TCSEC was the first criteria developed to directly address the 
specific security features, and assurance requirements for multilevel systems, however it 
does not specifically extend to networks. In 1987, the National Computer Security Center 
published the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) to provide this association [Ref. 7]. 
This thesis will use each of these documents as the basis for its descriptive overview of 
the MLS LAN's system security, assurance, communications integrity and transmission 
security features. 
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3. MLS LAN Project Goals 
The MLS LAN Project is an effort to provide government and commercial 
organizations with a cost effective, multilevel networking solution by leveraging existing 
high assurance technology. The ultimate goal of the project is to demonstrate a prototype 
network design that offers the ability to provide concurrent high assurance access for 
network users to data at multiple sensitivity levels through the incorporation of 
inexpensive commercial personal computers and software. The intended design of the 
network is to integrate the security features of a previously evaluated Class B3 high 
assurance server, the Wang Government Services Incorporated XTS-300™, with the 
conveniences of up-to-date operating systems and the latest commercial office 
automation software. The current plan for the MS LAN network architecture is to 
provide this functionality using the universally accepted TCPIIP protocol suite to allow 
our multilevel networking functionality to be layered on top of any chosen technology 
used in the lower layers of the OSI model. When completed, the MLS LAN will provide 
a cost effective multilevel solution within an easy-to-use office environment. 
4. Thesis Goals 
The MLS LAN is comprised of multiple components; each providing essential 
functions to ensure the network maintains absolute control over all accesses to its data, 
information, and services. Additionally, the LAN must provide verifiable protection 
against disclosure and modification of information during its transmission on the 
network's communications channels. To accomplish these objectives two things must be 
completed. First, the components of the MLS LAN must be described with respect to 
their design requirements and their incorporation into the proposed architecture. Second, 
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the method with which these components communicate with each other must be chosen 
in light of security and purpose. This thesis will describe, through a high level overview, 
each of the current MLS LAN components; their functionality; and the rationale behind 
the requirements assigned to them in the MLS LAN Project System Requirements 
Document [Appendix A]. This thesis will also establish a communications framework 
for these components as they provide network functionality to the users. The thesis will 
study the connectivity requirements as outlined in the MLS LAN Project Protocol High 
Level Analysis Document [Appendix B] and propose solutions for each. 
B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Chapter I discusses the purpose and goals of this thesis in the context of the 
problem that the MLS LAN Project has addressed and describes the how the project, in 
its entirety, proposes a solution. This chapter also provides an overview of the following 
chapters and appendixes: Chapter IT- The MLS LAN Systems Architecture; Chapter Ill 
- Protected Communications Channel Security; Chapter IV - Overview of the MLS LAN 
Connection Framework; Chapter V - Conclusions and Recommendations; Appendix A -
The MLS LAN Systems Requirements Document; Appendix B -The MLS LAN 
Protocol High Level Analysis; The MLS LAN Connection Framework Document. Each 
of these Chapters is sketched below. 
2. The MLS LAN Systems Architecture 
The MLS LAN is comprised of three primary components as outlined in 
Appendix A. The principle component is the network Trusted Computing Base (TCB ), 
which provides a penetration resistant security perimeter for MLS LAN operations. The 
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TCB is partitioned among the MLS LAN components to ensure the network as a whole 
enforces the overall network security policy. The Network Application Protocol Services 
provide functionality for access to available software, file transfer, electronic mail, or 
remote printing. Finally, the MLS LAN requires a network computer or workstation that 
can be employed by the user to access MLS LAN resources and functionality [Appendix 
A]. Chapter II will describe the makeup of each of these components, their functionality 
and how the network as a whole is constructed. 
3. Protected Communications Channel Security 
MLS LAN is required to protect all communications channels used by the 
network against disclosure and modification of the information transmitted. This is 
accomplished through the use of a protected communications channel established by the 
TCB. There are several options for the logical placement of the encryption mechanism 
that secures this channel. Chapter III will provide an overview of these options and 
evaluate their applicability for use in the MLS LAN Project. 
4. Overview of the MLS LAN Connection Framework 
The MLS LAN connection framework provides an overview of the parameters for 
initiation, security and communications establishment between two or more components 
of the MLS LAN. Chapter N will describe the processing involved with each 
connection protocol used to establish a single-level session and to conduct operations on 
the LAN. The description will provide an overview of each connection in terms of the 
data required by each component, the data structures required for transmission and the 
usable states and transitions required for data transfer. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter V contains the conclusions made for the use of the proposed architecture 
and connection framework as defined in the thesis. This chapter will also make 
recommendations pertaining to future research for aspects of the MLS LAN Project. 
C. APPENDIX OVERVIEW 
1. Appendix A: The NPS CISR MLS LAN System Requirements 
Document 
The bulk of the research into the definition of the MLS LAN' s architecture and its 
components was conducted as an engineering team effort. The appendix is the result of a 
collaboration to define the true requirements and functionality required of the MLS LAN 
Project. 
2. Appendix B: The NPS CISR MLS LAN Protocol Requirements 
Document 
As with the Systems Requirement Document, this appendix was also developed 
by an engineering team. This document outlines the requirements levied on each of the 
connection protocols of the MLS LAN. 
3. Appendix C: The MLS LAN Connection Protocol Framework 
The connection framework appendix provides a descriptive overview of the 
datagram format and packaging, as well as the state options and transitions for each 
protocol used in MLS LAN connection. 
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II. NPS MLS LAN SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
A. THE MLS LAN PROJECT ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
1. System Definition and Accreditation 
The purpose of the MLS LAN Project is to design a trusted network system. A 
network system is the "entire collection of hardware, firmware, and software necessary to 
provide a desired functionality" [Ref. 7]. This Chapter is not intended to define the entire 
network. system, but to provide an overview of the major components that comprise the 
MLS LAN architecture. The Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) defines a component 
as, "any part of a system that, taken by itself, provides all or a portion of the total 
functionality required of the system. A component is recursively defined to be an 
individual unit, not useful to further subdivide, or a collection of components up to and 
including the entire system". [Ref. 7] This view of system components is germane to the 
architectural overview because of the way the MLS LAN envisions its accreditation and 
evaluation. 
There are two predominant views for how a trusted network system can be 
evaluated. The first looks at the policy enforcement provided by the trusted network 
components as a single entity. The network implements a reference monitor and has a 
single "Network Trusted Computing Base" (NTCB). A single accrediting authority then 
generally accredits the entire system. The second view, known as the "Interconnected 
Accredited AIS View", is more distributed in nature. It "recognizes that parts of the 
network may be independently created, managed, and accredited" [Ref. 7]. An 
interconnected network system consists of "multiple systems (some of which may be 
trusted) that have been independently assigned operational sensitivity ranges (the highest 
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and lowest sensitivity levels of information that may be simultaneously processed on that 
system). In this view, each network system is individually accredited to handle sensitive 
information at either a single level or over a range of multiple levels" [Ref. 7]. The MLS 
LAN Project intends to use the interconnected accreditation process to facilitate the 
evaluation of its modular design and to enable individual accreditation of the MLS LAN 
regardless of its future connectivity to other secure networks such as the DoD's Secure 
Internet Protocol Routed Network (SIPRNET). 
The evaluation criterion for a trusted network system requires a statement 
of the security policy that is enforced. In addition, a Class B3 system must provide a 
formal Security Policy Model, which proves the assertion that the TCB and its 
implemented reference validation mechanisms correctly enforce the system's security 
policy [Ref. 4]. The MLS LAN incorporates two such security models, one for non-
disclosure or secrecy and another for non-contamination or information integrity. The 
following subsections outline these models. 
a. The Bell and LaPadula (BLP) Model 
The Bell and LaPadula Model [Ref. 8] is a mathematical model describing 
the allowable paths for information flow in a secure system where it is important to 
maintain secrecy [Ref. 9]. The model uses the concept of a finite-state machines to define 
the security requirements for computer systems to concurrently handle data at different 
sensitivity levels. This is useful in systems where a machine may be required to handle, 
for example, both Top Secret and Confidential information at the same time. The BLP 
model describes the allowable communications in the system which prevent programs 
processing top secret data from leaking their information into the confidential data and 
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prevents the confidential users from accessing the top secret data. This model has been 
adopted by most DoD MLS systems and provides an abstract formal treatment of what is 
known as the military security policy [Ref. 9]. 
The components defined in the BLP model consist first of a set of subjects 
S. The term subject is used to describe an active entity in a computer system, such as 
users, processes or executable programs. The next component is a set of objects 0. The 
term object refers to the passive entities in a computer system, such as files, directories, 
or dataQ.ases. The third component is a set of modes of access A (e.g., read, write, 
execute, append) 1• The final component is the set of security levels L. 
The term "dominance", characterized by the symbol ;;::, is "used to limit 
the sensitivity and content of information a subject can access" [Ref. 9]. It can be said 
that o dominates s (o;;:: s) if the hierarchical security rank assigned too is at least as high 
as that of s. For instance, Secret dominates Unclassified because, using the DoD 
hierarchical classification structure, a Secret Security level is higher than an Unclassified 
Security level. Under the BLP model, therefore, a state is considered secure if for each 
triple consisting of (s E S, o E 0, a E A), the following two properties are satisfied [Ref. 
6]: 
• The "Simple Security Property" or "no-read up property" - This property is 
used to prevent a subject from reading an object when the security level 
assigned to the subject does not dominate the security level of the object, e.g., 
read permitted iff i ;;:: oL 
1 It should be noted that in this context I use the notion that "read" and "execute" denote 
a read-only, an "append" denotes a write-only and a "write" denote a capability to read 
and write. 
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"In the military model, this property says that the security class (clearance) of someone 
receiving a piece of information must be at least as high as the [security] class 
(classification) of the information [Ref. 9]. 
• The (Confinement or Star) "* Property" or "no-write down property"- This 
property is used to prevent a subject from writing to an object when the 
security level assigned to the object does not dominate the security level of the 
subject, e.g., 
write permitted iff oL;?: i 
In the military model, the * property prevents a user operating in a Secret Session from 
writing a document that is classified Confidential. 
b. The Biba Integrity Model 
The Biba model [Ref. 1 0] is intended to address the control of 
information flow with respect to data integrity or non-contamination. The Biba model 
introduced two basic properties that are very similar to the BLP model, however its 
perspective is orthogonal to that of the BLP model rules. 
The components defined in the Biba model also consist of a set of subjects 
S, a set of objects 0, and a set of modes of access A (read, write, execute, append). 
However, instead of levels of security, Biba uses the set of integrity levels L. Integrity is 
maintained if for each triple consisting of (s E S, o E 0, a E A), the following two 
properties are satisfied [Ref. 6]: 
• The "Simple Integrity Property" or "no-write up property"- This property is 
used to prevent a subject from writing to an object when the integrity level 
assigned to the subject does not dominate the integrity level of the object, e.g., 
write permitted iff sL;?: oL 
The basic purpose of the simple integrity property is to prevent a low integrity, or 
unreliable subjects from modifying high integrity objects. 
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• The (Integrity Confinement)"* Integrity Property" or "no-read down 
property" - This property is used to prevent a subject from reading an object 
when the integrity level assigned to the object does not dominate the integrity 
level of the subject, e.g., 
read permitted iff oL ~ i 
The integrity property prevents a high integrity, or reliable subject from accessing a low 
integrity or unreliable object. This ensures that highly reliable subjects run only highly 
reliable software. 
The two models, BLP addressing inappropriate disclosure, and Biba 
addressing integrity, are used in conjunction to provide an appropriate dominance 
relationship for the MLS LAN and can be used as a joint enforcement mechanism for 
both secrecy and integrity throughout the network. 
2. Component Description 
The MLS LAN is comprised of three components. The principle component is 
the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which provides a penetration resistant security 
enforcement mechanism for MLS LAN operations. The second component, the Network 
Application Protocol Services provides the functionality required for network access to 
available application software, file transfer, electronic mail, or remote printing. Finally, 
the MLS LAN will use a network computer or workstation that can be employed by the 
user to access any required network functionality. The components of the MLS LAN are 
depicted in figure 2.1. 
a. The Trusted Computing Base 
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) in a network, like a stand-alone 
system, consists of all of the security-relevant portions of the network. But, unlike the 
stand-alone system, a network configuration may distribute the security mechanisms to 
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various components in the system. This distribution is referred to in [Ref. 7] as a 
"Partitioned Network TCB". The MLS LAN TCB components are presently built upon 
the Wang Government Services, Inc. XTS-300™ systems architecture. This systems 
architecture affords the XTS-300 security kernel complete control of the 
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Figure 2.1 MLS LAN Components 
MLS LAN trusted user-developed code. This user-developed code is installed to extend 
the TCB to the workstations, create secure session application connections, and protect 
communications. The XTS-300 uses a four-ring structure or hardware abstraction, with 
each ring defining a level or domain in which a process can execute. Protection during 
process execution is afforded through the ring structure by isolating the security domains 
in hardware thus preventing system processes from tampering with each other. The 
XTS-300 defines these domains as four primary software components: The Security 
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Kernel, Trusted System Services (TSS), Trusted Software and Commodity Application 
System Services (CASS) and Untrusted Applications. 
Ring 0, the Security Kernel domain, is the most privileged. It contains the 
Reference Validation Mechanism and provides basic operating system services such as 
MAC and DAC policy enforcement for process and device objects, resource 
management, process handling, and interrupt handling. Ring 1, the Trusted System 
Services domain is controlled by the security kernel and provides "networking, 1/0, file 
system _:p1anagement, and file system object discretionary access policy enforcement for 
both trusted and untrusted processes" [Ref. 11]. Ring 2, Trusted Software and CASS, is 
shared by the trusted software such as the STOP operating system or user-developed 
trusted code and the untrusted CASS. Trusted software functions allow system operators 
and administrators to perform security related housekeeping or other privileged tasks not 
supported by the STOP components. Ring 3, Application Domain, is reserved for user 
processes and is the least privileged. An abstract depiction of the XTS-300 architecture 
is provided in figure 2.2 [Ref. 11]. 
The XTS-300 supports many of the MLS LAN TCB requirements outlined 
in Appendix A, such as Secure Attention Key (SAK) recognition and processing, user 
access identification and authentication (I & A), session control and TCPIIP 
configuration management [Ref. 12]. The MLS LAN trusted processes that reside in 
Ring 2 provide for MLS LAN specific procedures such as the extension of the TCB to the 
TCBE and the provision of communications protection. These trusted processes, which 
are controlled by the XTS-300 hardware and software (Rings 0 &1), the TCB Extension 
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hardware, and the protocols defined for connecting two MLS LAN components comprise 
the subcomponents of the MLS LAN TCB. 
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(1) Protected Channel Initiator. This trusted process is 
responsible for the creation of the Protected Communications Channel (PC C) between 
two MLS LAN components. The initiator process will enforce a ''two-way" mutual 
hardware authentication between the two connecting entities and provide security and 
integrity protection on all transmitted data. The Protected Communications Channel 
provides the secure conduit through which all other connection protocols operate and 
provides the basis for extending the TCB from the XTS-300 to the distributed 
components, e.g., TCBE or other source hosts. Effectively, these protected extensions 
allow us to view the distributed TCB as one logical TCB, from a security perspective. 
The use of this channel also provides fault tolerance protection in the event of component 
loss, as the communications between the two PCC connected entities will cease, but the 
overall network will not be affected. The protocol framework for this channel is 
discussed in Chapter IV, however the design ofthe Protected Channel Initiator process is 
left to future work. 
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(2) Session Database Server. The Session Database Server is a 
trusted process that manages the session status data for each user logged into the MLS 
LAN. Session status modification requests are permitted only from the TCB Extension 
Server. These requests are made using a specified Session Status Protocol. Other TCB 
entities may query the information in the database, using a this protocol, however no 
"write" or modification access is granted. The query allows session servers or other 
entities to receive a listing of the current session information on a user. Currently the 
datab~_e is maintained on a single XTS-300 source host, however in the future, this 
server could provide the database synchronization required to incorporate a distributed 
implementation of the database. The loss of communications between the TCB Extension 
Server and the SDS could allow unwarranted access to the MLS LAN. To prevent an 
insecurity, the MLS LAN requires some control mechanism that could prevent new 
connections to the MLS LAN and its services in this event. The development of this 
mechanism is left to future work. 
(3) Trusted Computing Base Extension Server. The TCB 
Extension Server process was previously developed by the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Its purpose is to extend the TCB perimeter securely over the network to the requesting 
TCBE-equipped workstation. This process will be initiated only through the request for 
"secure attention" from a user. The Extension Server process is comprised of a single 
parent and multiple child processes that are responsible for accepting connections from 
the TCBE-equipped client workstations. The parent process will initially listen on an 
assigned port for incoming requests for secure attention. Once a request is received, the 
parent process will verify the identification and authentication of the requesting TCBE. 
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If the verification is successful, a child process is forked and the parent is able to 
relinquish control of the communications to the child. This frees the parent to listen for 
new connection requests. If the I & A is in error, the connection is terminated and no 
child is created [Ref. 13]. 
Each TCBE connection to the MLS LAN is therefore assigned an 
individual child TCB Extension Server process that will handle all of the security related 
operations necessary to establish and maintain a session on the MLS LAN. The current 
MLS LAN design enables the child process to present the user with menus, with which 
they may conduct all trusted path security-related operations such as "login" and "session 
negotiation". This process also controls the actions of the connected TCBE through 
specific TCBE state commands. The options, commands, and transitions used in this 
interaction are discussed in TCB-to-TCBE Connection Protocol section of Appendix C. 
At any time, the user may activate the Secure Attention Key (SAK) which will prompt 
the TCB Extension Server to interrupt the current running processes, verify the TCBE, 
and begin the user login or session negotiation process: The TCB Extension Server 
interaction is depicted in figure 2.3. 
A design consideration discussed during the development of the 
MLS LAN system architecture was the preservation of the trusted path connection 
between the TCB Extension Server and the TCBE-equipped workstation. Can this 
connection be terminated following session negotiation or must it be maintained 
throughout the lifetime of the user's connection to the MLS LAN? The answer rests 
upon the responsibilities of the TCB. The Extension Server is required to update the TCB 
on all connection and sessions established on the LAN. In essence, it maintains the "fail-
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secure" [Ref. 14] properties of the MLS LAN's distributed TCB by ensuring that 
information used by TCB entities to establish connections is current and correct. As 
mentioned previously, the Session Database Server maintains this information, but the 
Extension Server exclusively controls modification of the database. The Extension Server 
will modify the database upon initialization of a user session, a session change, a user 
logout or TCBE disconnection from the LAN. This methodology ensures that the session 
database is the current depiction of the MLS LAN. From this example, it is obvious that 
the Ext~nsion Server - TCBE trusted path must either be maintained following the initial 
session establishment to support session changes or that the path must be reestablished to 
effect changes. 
During normal LAN operations, there seems to be no requirement 
for the Extension Server - TCBE trusted path. The user has set his session and is 
operating normally. The database is current and only a renegotiation with the Extension 
Server will change it. Application protocol requests from the user cause the application 
servers to query the information maintained by the Session Database Server. The 
information returned from the query enables the application protocol requests to be 
validated against the TCB' s trusted session information. If a request is not commensurate 
with the user's current session, the Secure Session Server will deny access rather than 
compromise the system. Session level modifications are conducted simply by activating 
the SAK arid reestablishing the Extension Server- TCBE trusted path to change session 
levels. 
One of the protection mechanisms, however, sought for the MLS 
LAN is the ability of the TCB to maintain control over the user's LAN connection. The 
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intent is to enable the TCB to confirm that the user is actually still physically there. This 
future requirement presents an issue with respect to normal LAN operations and the use 
of the TCBE-to-TCB connection. With no continuous connection between the TCBE and 
the TCB Extension Server or a mechanism to limit the time that a user may remain in a 
session without the physical activation of the Secure Attention Key, how does the TCB 
know the user is still there? The solution to this issue is beyond the scope of this 
document and will be left to future work. 
(4) Trusted Computing Base Extension. The TCBE is an 
enhanced network interface card (NIC) that is installed into the MLS LAN workstation to 
support a trusted path interface to the user. The current test platform has been prototyped 
utilizing the Intel™ i960 processor. The TCBE provides the MLS LAN with a verifiable 
high assurance entity that can be used to extend the TCB. It provides the user with the 
Secure Attention Key mechanism for Trusted Path initiation and will provide 
communications protection, through the establishment of a Protected Communications 
Channel, to components of the MLS LAN. The TCBE, through state commands from the 
TCB Extension Server controls the disk operating system and applications used on the 
workstation. Additionally, the TCBE ensures appropriate object reuse between session 
security levels. 
(5) MLS LAN Connection Protocols. The TCB utilizes a 
number of specific connection protocols to establish a session and conduct operations on 
the MLS LAN. The most fundamental of these is the Protected Communications Channel 
(PCC) Protocol. The PCC protocol is used to establish the security conduit through which 
all other MLS LAN protocols must operate. Once the PCC is established, the TCBE 
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must "connect" to the TCB Extension Server for login and session negotiation. The 
TCB-to-TCBE Protocol is used for this purpose. During the session negotiation, the TCB 
Extension Server updates the user session information through the Session Database 
Server to reflect the parameters of his current session. The Session Status Protocol 
supports these operations. Once a session 
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Figure 2.3 TCB Extension Server Interactions 
is established, the user may require connectivity with a MLS LAN Application Protocol 
Server. These operations are conducted through the Secure Session Server. The Session 
Server Protocol supports requests for application protocol services. Prior to the Secure 
Session Server fulfilling the user's application protocol request, a listing is requested of 
the Session Database Server to verify the user's current session information. The Secure 
Session Server uses the Session Status Protocol to make this query. In the future there 
may be additional protocols defined for the MLS LAN to provide services to 
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workstations not utilizing a TCBE, however, these are not currently part of the 
framework. A depiction of the expected protocol usage is provided in figure 2.4. An 
overview of each of these protocols will be provided in Chapter IV and with a detailed 
description contained in Appendix C. 
b. MLS LAN Network Application Protocol Services 
The MLS LAN is designed to support the use of multiple simultaneous 
accesses to higher layer protocol services, such as HTTP, IMAP or FTP. The access to 
this information is controlled through the TCB in accordance with the security policy. A 
trusted process known as the Secure Session Server, validates and creates the connection. 
The Application Protocol Server (APS) is an untrusted application layer process that 
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( 1) Secure Session Server. The Secure Session Server process 
is comprised of a single parent and multiple child processes for each platform on which a 
given application protocol is hosted. These trusted processes reside in the Trusted 
Software portion of the XTS-300 architecture and are controlled by the Security Kernel. 
The Secure Session Server parent process is responsible for accepting connections from 
TCBE-equipped client workstations and establishing the TCPIIP protocol service for the 
user. The parent process will initially listen on an assigned port for incoming requests for 
protocQ.l service. Once a request is received, the parent process will verify the user's MLS 
LAN session with the Session Database Server. If the verification is successful, a child 
process is forked and the parent is able to relinquish control of the communications to the 
child. This frees the parent to listen for new connection requests. If the database query is 
in error, the connection is terminated and no child is created [Ref.l3]. 
Each protocol service request is therefore assigned an individual 
child Secure Session Server process that will handle all of the protocol transmissions to 
and from the APS. The child process is responsible for the creation of a unique 
Application Protocol Server process tied directly to the user through a handle created 
from the session data received from the Session Database Server (user name, session 
level). A depiction of the Sec~re Session Server/Application Protocol Server interaction 
is provided in figure 2.5. 
(2) Application Protocol Server. The Application Protocol 
Server process is responsible for implementing the server portion of the application level 
protocol. This process will support only a single protocol and is untrusted with respect to 
the data stored on the server. The source code for these processes is intended to be an 
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implementation of the industry standard application protocol, with minor modifications 
where necessary for MLS LAN integration. Communications between the client 
workstation and the APS will be maintained exclusively through the Secure Session 
Server and are constrained by the underlying TCB [Ref. 13]. 
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Figure 2.5 Secure Session Server I Application Protocol Server Interaction 
c. MLS LAN Workstation 
The MLS LAN client workstation is designed to be a commercially 
procured "thin client" diskless workstation. The workstation will operate under the 
control of the TCBE. Each workstation will support no more than one logged in user at a 
time. The workstation will support up-to-date commercial operating systems and 
application software. A future requirement for the MLS LAN will allow non-TCBE 
equipped workstations to connect to the LAN. This would permit "anonymous" access to 
selected application services. 
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III. PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL SECURITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The MLS LAN TCB is required to "provide protection against disclosure and 
modification of information on all communications channels used by the network" 
[Appendix A]. To accomplish this, digital communications encryption will be used. 
Generally, there are two common approaches used to provide this capability: Link 
Encrypt~pn and End-to-End Encryption. 
Link encryption takes place at the physical layer of the Open Systems Interface 
cosn model through the use of special encryption devices connected at the point where 
the physical media exits each node. This technique would require that each MLS LAN 
workstation and source host be equipped with an additional encryption hardware device 
and symmetric encryption key. This, of course, would place a significant number of 
additional burdens on the TCB. The most significant of these is the management and 
dissemination of the appropriate keying material for these devices. How would the 
Security Manager change the device key at both the client workstation and source host 
each time a user changes his session level? Does each source host require an encryption 
device for each workstation connected to the LAN? Because of these issues, link 
encryption cannot be considered a viable option for Protected Communications Channel 
(PCC) implementation. 
End-to-End encryption utilizes the higher layers of the OSI model to provide 
protection and therefore there are several options for the logical placement of the 
encryption. One method of encryption is to allow each individual application to apply its 
own security protection. This is known as Application-Level Security. With application-
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level security only the user data portion of the TCP segment is encrypted and 
unfortunately requires the Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) applications to be 
equipped with an encryption capability or to modify the application for this purpose. The 
use of application level encryption is insufficient for the MLS LAN as there is no way to 
enforce the requirements implicit in the reference monitor concept. Additionally, to 
require the MLS LAN to modify each application for appropriate security protection 
defeats the intended goal of the MLS LAN project [Ref. 15]. 
__ This leaves two other options for the logical placement of the encryption 
protection for the PCC: the Transport Layer or the Network Layer. Each of these OSI 
layers has a standard security protocol defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). This chapter will provide an overview of these two protocols and evaluate their 
applicability for use in the MLS LAN. 
B. TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY PROTOCOL 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol was designed to make use of the 
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) to provide privacy and data integrity on end-to-end 
communications between two client/server applications. TLS was originated by 
Netscape as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol and published as an Internet draft 
document. Subsequently the ITEF formed a working group to produce an Internet 
Standard that became Request For Comment (RFC) 2246, the TLS Protocol Version 1.0 
[Ref. 16]. Currently, the most use of transport layer security is in the World Wide Web 
client/server transfer service provided by the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). 
Virtually all HTTP application clients and servers have been modified to recognize TLS, 
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however any end system can modify its higher layer protocol applications (e.g., FfP, 
I.MAP, or SMTP) to incorporate TLS. 
TLS introduces two new protocol layers above TCP to provide reliable end-to-end 
secure services as depicted in figure 3.1. These two layers allow independent programs to 
successfully exchange cryptographic parameters without knowledge of one another's 
code. The TLS protocol is written such that "the decisions on how to initiate TLS 
handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates exchanged are left up to 
the judgment of the designers and implementers of protocols which run on top" [Ref. 16]. 
TLS TLS Change TLS Application 
Handshake Cipher Spec Alert Data 
Protocol Protocol Protocol Protocol 
TLS Record Protocol 
TCP 
IP 
Figure 3.1 TLS Protocol Stack [Ref. 13] 
The TLS Record Protocol layer provides higher layer protocols connection 
security that has two basic properties: confidentiality through the use of a negotiated 
symmetric key and reliability through the use of keyed Message Authentication Codes. 
To perform these functions, the Record Protocol Layer fragments, compresses, adds the 
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authentication code and encrypts the information from the four TLS defined higher layer 








Figilre 3.2 TLS Record Protocol Operation [Ref. 15] 
The most complex of these higher layer protocols is the Handshake Protocol. It 
"consists of a suite of three sub-protocols which are used to allow peers to agree .upon 
security parameters for the record layer, authenticate themselves, instantiate negotiated 
security parameters, and report error conditions to one another" [Ref. 16]. The other three 
upper layer protocols use the lower Record Protocol layer to pass application or control 
information between the client and server. The Change Cipher Spec Protocol consists of a 
single message, which causes the negotiated cipher suite to become the current 
encryption suite. The Alert Protocol conveys TLS-related alerts to the peer entity. If the 
alert is considered fatal, TLS will terminate the connection. Examples of alert messages 
are: Incorrect MAC, Bad Certificate, Certificate Expired, or a Handshake Failure. 
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"Servers and clients are required to forget any session-identifiers, keys, and secrets 
associated with a failed connection" [Ref.l6]. 
The handshake protocol consists of a series of messages exchanged between the 
client and server that use public key cryptography or asymmetric algorithms to negotiate 
a symmetric master secret with which all other transmissions will be secured. Public key 
algorithms, invented by Witfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [Ref. 17] utilize two keys. A 
private key is created and protected by the owner, and a matching public key is published 
for oth~.rs to use. When a message is encrypted with one of these keys it can only be 
decrypted by its matching key and since it is impossible to derive the private key from the 
public, the technique is considered to be computationally secure. An example of how the 
handshake messages establish the master secret is summarized as follows and depicted in 
figure 3.3: 
1. Client/Server Hello Messages 
The Client sends a "client_hello" message to which the server must respond with 
a "server_hello" message or a fatal error will occur and the connection will fail. The 
client_hello message contains: 
• The client's TLS version number 
• Cipher suite settings that the can be supported by the client. 
• The requested session id if a previous session is to be used. If this is a new 
connection, this field is left blank. 
• Compression methods supported by the client. 
• A randomly generated value. 
In response the server _hello message contains: 
• The TLS version number that will be used. 
• A specific cipher suite selected from the list provided by the client. 
• The session id assigned to this connection. 
• A specific compression method selected from the list provided by the 
client. 
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• A randomly generated value (different from the client's). 
If the agreed-upon key method requires, the server will immediately follow the 
hello message with its public key certificate. Generally this will be an X.509v3 [Ref. 18] 
certificate. It must contain a key that corresponds to the key exchange algorithm selected 
or a fatal error will result. Following the server certificate, the server may send a 
"server_key _exchange" message. This message is sent only when the server certificate 
message does not contain enough data to allow the client to exchange a pre-master secret 
[Ref. 16J. The server_key_exchange message contains either an RSA [Ref. 19] or a 
Diffie-Hellman public key to encrypt the pre-master secret. The Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange provides a secure method to establish a shared secret between the parties of the 
exchange. The result of this exchange will be the pre-master key. The server can 
optionally request a certificate from the client by using the certificate request message. 
Once the server has completed the above messages, it will send a 
"server_hello_done" message. This message conveys to the client that the server has 
passed all of the transactional information necessary to support the key exchange. After 
sending this message, the server will wait for a client response. 
2. Key Generation Messages 
The first message a client can send following the "server_hello_done" is the 
"client_ certificate" message. If no suitable certificate is available, the client should send 
the message containing no certificates. If the server requires authentication, this may 
result in a fatal handshake error passed in an "alert" protocol message. The client will 
follow its certificate with the "client_key_exchange" message, which sets the pre-master 
key using either the RSA-encrypted secret or a Diffie-Hellman exchange. If the client 
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certificate has signing capability, the client will finalize the key exchange by explicitly 
verifying its certificate in a "client_ certificate_ verify" message. 
The successful setting of the pre-master key and the authentication of the 
communicating peers will be followed by a "change_cipher_spec" protocol message. 
This message converts the new generated (pending) cipher specifications into the 
validated (current) encryption scheme. The client immediately sends a "finished" 
message using the new algorithms, keys and secrets. In response, the server will send its 
own "ch.ange_cipher_spec" message and "finished" message using the new encryption 
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Figure 3.3 TLS Handshake Protocol Message Exchange [Ref. 16] 
From this point on, application data may be passed to the lower layer of the 
Record Layer for secure transmission (see Figure 3.1). It must be noted that it is up to the 
higher layer application to be cognizant of the security requirements of their 
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transmissions, as TLS may not negotiate the strongest possible connection for their use. 
For example, the application must be aware that the security policy requires at least 
3DES with a 1024 bit RSA key exchange to provide adequate protection for secret data. 
If the connecting server's highest encryption transform is DES, the application must 
recognize a security problem and terminate the connection. This adds significant 
complexity to the use of TLS in multilevel systems. Additionally, the client must 
specifically request that the server authenticate itself or the handshake protocol will skip 
this exG.hange [Ref. 15]. 
C. INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY 
The Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) standard was designed to provide 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity across an untrusted network environment 
such as the Internet. IPSec operates in layer 3 or the Network layer of the OSI stack. 
The application of protection in the lower layers "reduces the explosion in the 
implementation of security protocols at the higher layer. If security is implemented at 
higher layers, each application has to design its own security mechanism" [Ref.20]. This 
flexibility allows IPSec to encapsulate "all and any kind of Internet traffic ... [while 
allowing] per flow or per connection security" [Ref 20]. Unlike TLS, IPSec is not 
restricted to end systems, but can protect packets between two hosts, between network 
security gateways (e.g., routers and firewalls) or a combination of the two. This allows 
IPSec to individually handle each IP datagram based on the traffic to protect, the unique 
and appropriate encryption scheme for protection and to whom the traffic is to be 
delivered [Ref.20]. The overall architecture as outlined in [Ref. 22], defines three major 
components of the IPSec family. The first provides a method to represent and implement 
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the intended security policy. The second component includes the protocols that provide 
the confidentiality, authentication, and integrity to the IP packets and the third defines the 
key negotiation/management structure. 
1. Security Policy 
The mission of a security policy is to "ensure that network components support 
the basic principles of information security: protect information from unauthorized or 
accidental modification, destruction, and disclosure and ensure timely availability and 
usability of those data" [Ref. 23]. This is a bit broader definition than that of the 
Automated Security Policy presented in [Ref. 5], but the intent is provide a direct 
correlation between the information protection requirements and the mechanisms that 
provide the security. IPSec gives the user a "standard, robust, and extensible mechanism 
to provide security to IP and the upper layers (e.g. UDP or TCP) in direct support of the 
organization's unique security requirements" [Ref. 20]. This is accomplished through the 
use of a Security Policy Database (SPD). 
Once the organization has determined which transmission links are to implement 
IPSec, a database is created to store this information. The Security Policy Database 
(SPD) is populated with attributes that can be extracted from the network and transport 
layer headers and used to determine the security services afforded to a packet. Each SPD 
entry has the following fields: 
• Source Address 
• Destination Address 
• Name (This is a unique DNS name, X.500, or Distinguished Name used 
during key exchange negotiations) 
• Protocol (e.g., FTP, HTTP, IMAP) 
• Data Sensitivity Level 
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• Upper layer ports (This is the unique TCP port number assignment for the 
Upper layer protocol) 
[Ref. 22] 
The SPD entry uses this information as selectors to define one of three actions to take 
place for each packet: 
• Discard the packet 
• Bypass security on the packet - do not apply IPSec 
• Apply IPSec to the packet. [Ref. 22] 
The type of security services to be applied is designated using the concept of security 
associations (SA). 
Security associations are essentially contracts between two communicating 
entities that outline the parameters required to securely transmit information. A SA is 
unidirectional and protocol-specific in nature. In other words, they describe the specific 
transmission state parameters (i.e., security protocol, transforms or encryption algorithms, 
key, key duration, etc.) that must be established from entity A to entity Bin order to 
transmit securely. A separate and distinct SA must be defined to transmit from entity B 
back to entity A. SAs can be created manually through verbal or written agreements, or 
dynamically through an Internet standard key management protocol such as the Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE), provided by IPSec [Ref. 24]. Once an SA is created, a Security 
Parameter Index (SPI) is assigned which uniquely identifies the SA to the receiver. The 
SPI is a 32-bit identifier that accompanies the state information as it is entered into the 
host's Security Association Database (SADB). 
An SADB is created for any entity that implements IPSec protocols. The SADB 
maintains all of the active SAs for both incoming and outgoing processing. The listed 
SAs in the database are indexed using the unique SPI and contain the parameters 
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previously negotiated to create the secure communications state between the two entities. 
These parameters include: 
• Sequence number counter- a 32 bit field used to prevent replay attacks 
• Sequence counter overflow - describes the action taken following an 
overflow 
• Anti-replay Window- describes the size of the anti-replay sliding 
window. 
• AH Authentication Algorithm - The algorithm and keys used in AH. 
• ESP Encryption Algorithm- The encryption algorithm and keys used in 
ESP. 
• ESP Authentication Algorithm- The algorithm and keys used in ESP. 
• Lifetime - the duration of time that the SA is active. 
• Mode - IPSec can be used in either "transport" or "tunnel" mode. This 
field designates the mode used. 
• Tunnel destination -When using tunnel mode, this indicates the 
destination address of the outer header. 
• Path MTU parameters -- When using the tunnel mode, this field maintains 
the fragmentation and hop count information. [Ref. 22] 
Figure 3.4 depicts the logical policy entities that work together to evaluate every 
inbound and outbound IP packet to ensure the proper IPSec is applied. As an inbound IP 
datagram is received, its headers are evaluated against the selectors located in the SPD. 
If a "selector" designates that this packet must have IPSec applied, the SPD will query 
the SADB for the corresponding SA (or multiple SAs known as an SA bundle) described 
by the packet. If no SA is found the entity may dynamically create an SA based on IKE 
or the packet may be discarded. The SADB and SPI identify the unique security services 












Figure 3.4 IPSec Implementation Architecture, from [Ref. 20] 
2. Security Protocols 
IPSec defines two specific protocols that provide security services. The first, 
Authentication Header (AH), provides data integrity, authentication and optional 
protection against replay attacks. The second, Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
provides all of these services, but in addition, provides data confidentiality. Each of the 
protocols can be used in either the "tunnel" or "transport" mode providing multiple 
combinations of modes and protocols: 
• AH in transport mode 
• AH in tunnel mode 
• ESP in transport mode 
• ESP in tunnel mode 
The AH protocol is a very simple and sophisticated method to provide data integrity, 
source authentication and replay attack protection. Due to its simple design, AH requires 
only an AH header (there is no trailer data) to identify the specific SA to which it applies 
and the transform it uses. The AH header is inserted into the datagram following the 
original IP header and before the data payload (Figure 3.5). The original IP header's IP 
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protocol field is changed to 51 to signify that an AH header follows. The current 
specifications for the protocol are defined in [Ref. 25]. 
The security provided with AH comes from its ability to use an authenticator to 
protect either the upper layer protocol in the transport mode or an entire packet in the 
tunnel mode. The authentication field holds the result of the integrity checking function. 
This field is set to zero prior to the integrity computation and then the result is added 
prior to transmission. The authentication algorithm or hash function (such as Hash 
Message Authentication Code - Secure Hash Algorithm - 96 bit, HMAC-SHA-96, or 
Message Digest 5 - 96 bit, HMAC MDS-96), is negotiated as part of the unique SA. 
IPSec allows for the incorporation of additional algorithm transforms to be defined. 
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Figure 3.5 Authentication Header Datagram from [Ref. 20] 
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol provides data confidentiality 
and authentication to the IP packets through the use of two encryption algorithms. One, 
the encryptor, is used to protect the data payload and the other, the authenticator, verifies 
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the integrity of the packet. ESP can be used in two manners. First, it can encapsulate 
only the upper-layer protocol data to provide an encrypted segment of the original IP 
packet's payload. This allows the original IP header information (and new ESP 
header/trailer) to be seen. Alternatively, ESP can wrap the entire original IP datagram 
within an ESP shell. This second option places a new IP header in front of the ESP 
packet and allows opaque transmission of data to tunnel through the Internet. 
All encryption algorithms in ESP use a multiple of the block size of the cipher - or 
cipher b.lock chaining (CBC) - to encrypt the data. Currently only the DES-CBC 
transform specification is required for all ESP implementations, but other transforms such 
as Blowfish-CBC, CAST-CBC or 3DES-CBC can be implemented as options [Ref. 20]. 
This method of encryption requires an initialization vector (IV) to '}ump-start" the 
encryption process. TheN information is passed to the receiver in the ESP header 
following the SPI and sequence number similar to that of the AH (Figure 3.6). 
Additionally, padding may be required if the size of data being encrypted is not a 
multiple of the CBC block. The trailer contains the authentication digest to verify the 
integrity of the packet. This hash provides the necessary verification of the SPI, sequence 
number and N, which need to be transmitted in plaintext to establish the SA [Ref. 20]. 
In the transport mode, the original header's IP protocol field is changed to 50 to signify 
that an ESP header follows and the "ESP header is inserted between the IP header and the 
upper-layer protocol header. In the tunnel mode, the entire IP packet is encapsulated in 
the ESP header and a new IP header is added to that." [Ref. 20] The current specifications 





Figure 3.6 ESP Packet in Transport Mode [Ref. 19] 





Before an IP packet can be secured with IPSec, a security association must be 
established between the entities with which the transmission is to take place. As 
mentioned previously, this SA establishment can be created either through manual 
negotiation (offline) or dynamically through online negotiation. The Internet Key 
Exchange is a hybrid protocol based on a framework defined by the Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) to provide the dynamic 
negotiation of SAs. IKE is described in [Ref. 22] and incorporates parts of two separate 
key management protocols -Oakley and SKEME to provide for secure authenticated key 
exchange. As a hybrid protocol, "IKE uses the foundation of ISAKMP, the modes of 
Oakley, and the share andre-keying techniques of SKEME to define its own unique way 
of deriving authenticated keying material and negotiating shared policy" [Ref. 20]. 
45 
The ISAKMP protocol [Ref. 21] is the basis for the IKE negotiation of key 
exchange. It uses two separate phases of negotiation to establish the SA. "Phase One" 
verifies the identity of the two entities and sets up an ISAKMP security association 
between them. This is necessary to set up an authenticated and secure channel that 
subsequently can be used to negotiate the specific security services desired in the link. 
"Phase Two" is the actual negotiation of these services - such as IPSec. Once a Phase 
One SA has been established between two entities multiple Phase Two negotiations can 
be conqucted. ISAKMP does not define the method used to negotiate the SA policies; 
this is left to other key exchange documents such as IKE [Ref 20]. 
"IKE uses the language of ISAKMP to define a key exchange and a way to 
negotiate security services." [Ref. 20] IKE uses a predefined domain of interpretation 
(DOl) to outline the required and optional attributes that are negotiated during the Phase 
Two exchanges. During the IKE Phase One exchanges, the peers must agree on the 
"protection suite" to be used to encrypt and authenticate their messages. This suite 
defines the encryption algorithm, hash algorithm, authentication method, and public key 
exchange to be used. 
Once the IKE SA has been established, IKE uses the ISAKMP Phase Two 
exchanges to generate IPSec SAs. These exchanges effectively concatenate multiple 
protection suite proposals into the ISAKMP payload to negotiate the specific AH and 
ESP selectors required for the SA. During these exchanges, the selectors are outlined for 
the unique SA and each entity records the SA information into their SADB under a 
unique SPI. 
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D. SECURITY OPTIONS APPLICABILITY 
With proper implementation, both the Transport layer and the Network layer 
provide adequate end-to-end communications security for a specific connections. 
However, when the two are evaluated as to their specific applicability to the MLS LAN 
project, a number of characteristic differences are noted. 
1. Application Client/Server Modification 
One of the basic goals of the MLS LAN project is to provide a high assurance 
networ~ that can offer interoperability with commercially procured popular office 
automation or application software. TLS requires each of the specific higher layer 
protocol (HTTP, FfP, IMAP, etc.) clients and servers to be modified for "TLS 
awareness". IPSec, on the other hand has no such requirement. Each IP packet, 
regardless of application or transport layer protocol will be secured in accordance with 
the policy defined in the specific negotiated security association. In the MLS LAN, 
session level information provided to a higher layer application protocol is advisory in 
nature. Application protocols are not allowed to enforce security policy. 
2. Security Policy 
The MLS LAN project requires that each of the connections to the TCB have 
encryption protection that supports sensitivity levels equivalent to or higher than that of 
the session sensitivity level at which the user is operating. These connections may, in 
fact, use different encryption transforms depending on the purpose of the connection. For 
example, a connection to the IMAP server will require Protected Communications 
Channel with encryption security equal to the user's session level, however, the same 
user's connection to the TCB Extension Server for session establishment or renegotiation 
must secured sufficiently to support the system high. If the MLS LAN were to 
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implement TLS to ensure the appropriate level of protection is provided, each application 
client and server would require knowledge of both the cryptographic session 
requirements to be used and the context of the communications between the client and 
server. In multilevel systems applications are insufficient to enforce security policy. 
IPSec provides a mechanism through the Security Policy Database and Security 
Association Database to segregate the application of protection based upon a set of given 
attributes. This flexibility lends itself well to defining unique security tunnels to specific 
source b.osts throughout the MLS LAN. The initial SPD of the TCBE can be placed in 
non-volatile memory, established by the Security Manager with a single entry: to apply 
security to connect to the TCB Extension Server and disallow all other connections. 
Once a session has been established, the TCB Extension Server can update the TCBE 
SPD with the security connection information commensurate with the sensitivity level 
negotiated on the MLS LAN. From this SPD, the TCBE will correctly negotiate all other 
connections to MLS LAN hosts utilizing the standard Security Association setup of 
ISAKMP. This remote management of the security policy of IPSec is not covered in the 
[Ref. 21], however, a trusted agent developed in the TCB could easily create and pass this 
information through the TCB-TCBE Protected Communications Channel used to 
negotiate the session. 
3. Domain of Interpretation 
Another benefit of IPSec is the use of a predefined domain of interpretation 
(DOD. Currently the ISAKMP DOl, [Ref. 26] allows the definition a specific "situation" 
that uses semantics such as "situational identity", "situational secrecy" and "situational 
integrity" to assemble the parameters for a given Security Association (SA). The DOl 
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then defines specific "Protocol Identifiers", "Transform or encryption algorithm 
Identifiers" and attributes such as SA life duration and encapsulation modes to create an 
SA. The ISAKMP DOl does not specifically address multilevel security, however, a 
future project could be the development of a MLS DOl for this purpose. The MLS DOl 
could easily incorporate MLS LAN specific characterization such as limiting the SA life 
duration default from eight hours to four effectively preventing a workstation from 
remaining in a session too long without a SAK being physically activated. 
Jhe applicability of Network layer security through the use of IPSec complements 
the goals of the MLS LAN project. Commercial applications and higher layer protocols 
can be incorporated without code modification. Individual connectivity between end 
systems can use a single Protected Communications Channel to secure a number of 
separate protocol services. And most importantly, the Trusted Path can be verifiably 
secured between the TCB and a TCBE. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE MLS LAN CONNECTION FRAMEWORK 
This chapter provides an overview and synopsis of the MLS LAN connection 
protocols presented in the framework. A detailed description of these protocols, can be 
found in Appendix C. 
A. THE MLS LAN PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL 
PROTOCOL 
1. Overview 
-The Protected Communications Channel (PCC) protocol is used to create a 
security conduit between two MLS LAN TCB entities. All other MLS LAN protocols 
are then required to secure their traffic by using this conduit. The PCC is created through 
the use of IP layer security as defined in the IP Security Standard for the Internet [Ref. 
22]. It provides the MLS LAN with a trusted channel that enforces a "two-way" mutual 
hardware authentication between the two connecting entities and provides security and 
integrity protection on all transmitted data. The use of this channel also provides some 
fault tolerance protection in the event of component loss. This ensures that if the 
communications between the two Protected Communications Channel connected entities 
ceases, the overall network will not be affected. 
Since the MLS LAN utilizes the IP Security Standard (IPSec) to provide the 
framework for this channel, this document does not attempt to describe its architecture or 
mechanisms. Information of these topics can be found in the many RFCs that describe 
IPSec. Additionally, the specific design of the Protected Channel Initiator (PCI) and data 
structures necessary for IPSec implementation in the MLS LAN have yet to be finalized. 
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For this reason, the subsequent sections will provide an approach to be taken in the 
application of IPSec in the MLS LAN to create a PCC. 
2. Logical Placement of MLS LAN IPSec 
[Ref. 22] describes three common ways in which IPSec can be implemented in 
hosts, routers and security gateways. 
• Integration into the native IP layer implementation of the host. This 
requires access to the IP source code for the entity that is to use IPSec. 
.. ''Bump-in-the-Stack" (BITS) This implementation places the IPSec 
underneath an existing implementation of the IP protocol stack between the 
native IP and the local network drivers. This implementation does not require 
access to the IP source code utilized in the host. 
• "Bump-in-the-Wire" (BITW) This implementation places an outboard 
crypto processor that provides the IPSec security services. 
As described in Chapter ll, the MLS LAN uses the Wang Government Services, 
Inc. XTS-300™ high assurance server as its source host and includes a prototype TCBE 
utilizing the Intel™ i960 processor. To maintain simplicity of the XTS-300 security 
kernel, it is recommended that the MLS LAN implement IPSec in a BITS configuration 
and create the Protected Communications Initiator as user defined trusted code to be 
controlled by the security kernel. 
3. IPSec Security Policy for the MLS LAN 
Each connection to the MLS LAN TCB must be protected in a manner 
commensurate with the sensitivity of the information transmitted. The Security Manager, 
e.g., the person responsible information assurance at a given site installation of a MLS 
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LAN, must ensure that the strength of the assigned encryption mechanisms are sufficient 
to protect the given sensitivity level. Once assigned, the TCB will maintain a virtual 
table, which maps the strength of mechanism for a given encryption transform with the 
sensitivity levels it can support. When encrypted, the information is considered to be safe 
for transmission across any medium until it reaches its intended recipient. The recipient's 
act of decryption once again transforms the information into a sensitive form. IPSec 
provides a mechanism through the Security Policy Database and Security Association 
Datab~e to segregate the application of protection based upon a set of given attributes 
[Ref. 22]. The MLS LAN Security Manager will create a listing of the specific security 
parameters that a Protected Communications Channel must enforce for connection to 
each of the MLS LAN entities. This information will be maintained by the TCB and 
mapped to potential client session levels. This enables the TCB Extension Server to know 
the Security Policy Database (SPD) assignments for each session level. 
The initial Security Policy Database of the TCBE will be placed in non-volatile 
memory, established by the Security Manager with a single entry: to apply security to 
connect to the TCB Extension Server and disallow all other connections. Once a session 
has been established, the TCB Extension Server will update the TCBE SPD with the 
security connection information commensurate with the sensitivity level negotiated for 
the session. From this Security Policy Database, the TCBE will correctly negotiate all 
other connections to MLS LAN hosts utilizing the standard Security Association setup of 
ISAKMP [Ref. 21]. Additional encryption algorithms or transforms can be developed to 
provide higher levels of encryption, e.g., NSA approved Type I encryption, for use on the 
MLS LAN. This remote management of the security policy of IPSec is available only 
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because the MLS LAN TCBE can create the initial Protected Communications Channel 
at system high through the non-volatile Security Policy Database placed on the TCBE. 
A future requirement for the MLS LAN allows a TCBE-equipped workstation to 
operate as a Non-MLS LAN workstation, e.g., connect to untrusted protocol servers 
without first connecting to the MLS LAN TCB. In this situation, an additional Security 
Policy Database and Security Association Database may be required to establish 
"untrusted" (normal) IPSec security associations to commercial sites. The design and 
implem~ntation of these mechanisms is left to future work. 
4. IPSec Key Management for the MLS LAN 
The MLS LAN will use the standard Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [Ref. 24] to 
define a key exchange and to negotiate security services to be provided for each PCC. 
IKE uses a predefined domain of interpretation (DOl) to outline the required and optional 
attributes that are negotiated during the phase two exchanges. Currently the DOl is 
written specifically for use with the ISAKMP [Ref. 27]. This DOl may be sufficient to 
provide the security attributes necessary for use in an MLS environment, however, future 
research may discover that a specific DOl is needed for the MLS LAN Project. 
5. MLS LAN PCC Processing 
The first Protected Communications Channel established must be a connection 
between the TCBE-equipped workstation and the source host running the TCB Extension 
Server process. This is initiated by the TCBE once the user requests attention from the 
TCB by activating a SAK. The Protected Communications Initiator process on the TCBE 
will use the initial Security Policy Database setting to establish the IKE Phase One 
exchanges and establish a secure and authenticated communications channel between the 
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TCBE and the TCB Extension Server host. Once the IKE security association (SA) has 
been established, the Phase Two negotiations can then be sent to generate the appropriate 
incoming and outgoing IPSec SAs. This exchange negotiates the specific AH and ESP 
selectors required for each SA. During these exchanges, the selectors are outlined for the 
unique SA and each entity records the SA information into its Security Association 
Database under a unique Security Parameter Index. 
Once the Protected Communications Channel is established between the TCBE 
and the_)'CB Extension Server, the user will be allowed to login to the MLS LAN and 
negotiate a session. If the session establishment is successful, the TCB Extension Server 
will issue a "PCC Update" command and transfer the appropriate session level Security 
Policy data to the TCBE for inclusion in its Security Policy Database, as well as make 
available in the SPD the entries for communicating with other MLS LAN Components, 
e.g., Application Protocol Servers. 
From this point, the user is logged in and operating on the MLS LAN at the 
negotiated session level. As application protocol services are requested, the TCBE 
Protected Communications Initiator will use the same method as above to create a 
separate Protected Communications Channel to the host that supports the requested 
application protocol server. 
B. TCB-TCBE CONNECTION PROTOCOL 
1. Overview 
The TCB-TCBE Connection protocol is used to provide the Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB) with a method to conduct security related operations along a trusted path. 
This protocol is used by the TCBE as a method to gain secure attention from and to 
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respond to the commands of the TCB. The protocol also provides the TCB Extension 
Server with a method to control the actions of the TCBE through the use of specific 
TCBE state commands. The TCB-TCBE Connection protocol will only be initiated 
through a request for "secure attention" from the user. Protection against replay and 
spoofing is provided by the underlying Protected Communications Channel. 
2. TCBE and TCB Extension Server States 
a. TCBE States 
The TCBE will use input such as the user activation of the Secure 
Attention Key or commands received from the TCB Extension Server to change its 
configuration. This configuration is commonly referred to as the current state of the 
TCBE. This section will describe the TCBE allowable states, however, the derivation of 
these states is contained in Appendix C. 
There are a total of five allowable states for the TCBE. 
• State 1: Power Off- The TCBE is not powered or active. 
• State 2: Idle - The TCBE has been powered, and is prepared for user operations. 
• State 3: Unprotected Operations - The TCBE has allowed the client 
workstation to load the operating system, however, it is not connected to the MLS 
LAN TCB. The design for this state is left for future work. 
Future work should also include a method of login at "system low" that allows the 
TCB Extension Server knowledge of the user login but not force a purge of the 
Operating System. For example, this would allow a user who is operating in the 
Unprotected Operations State, to access the MLS LAN at the lowest possible 
sensitivity level and utilize print services without a system purge at login. 
• State 4: Trusted Processing - The TCBE is connected to the TCB to conduct 
"trusted path operations" such as User Identification and Authentication (I&A) 
and session negotiation. 
• State 5: Trusted Session- The TCBE is connected to the TCB in association 
with a specific negotiated user session level. All previous memory has been 
purged and a new operating system has been loaded. In this state, the TCBE 
allows MLS LAN session operations at the negotiated sensitivity level. 
56 
b. TCB Extension Server States 
The TCB Extension Server will use input such as the receipt of a Secure 
Attention Request, or TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol "response" payload type received 
from the TCBE to change its configuration. This configuration is commonly referred to 
as the current state of the TCB Extension Server. This section will describe the TCB 
Extension Server allowable states, however, the derivation of these states is contained in 
Appen4.ix C, Section 3.3. 
There are a total of six allowable states for the TCB Extension Server. 
• State 1: Power Off- In this state the TCB Extension Server is not powered or 
active. 
• State 2: Idle - The TCB Extension Server has been powered, and is listening for 
a Secure Attention Request (SAR) from TCBE to establish a connection. In this 
state the TCB Extension Server is not connected to the TCBE and the users is not 
logged in. 
• State 3: Connected -The TCB Extension Server has made a connection with the 
TCBE. The TCB has been extended to the TCBE-equipped workstation and using 
the TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol, User I&A can be conducted. 
• State 4: Logged In- The TCB Extension Seryer has validated the User I&A. The 
TCB Extension Server uses this state to conduct session negotiations through the 
TCBE to the user to establish a MLS LAN session. 
• State 5: Running- The TCB Extension Server is connected to the TCBE, and 
has a user running trusted session operations in the MLS LAN. 
• State 6: Trusted Session Processing - The TCB Extension Server is still 
connected to the TCBE and has a valid MLS LAN User logged in, however, a 
Secure Attention Request has been received. The TCB Extension Server uses this 
state to interact with the user through the TCBE to change the status of his 
session. 
3. TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol Datagrams 
The TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol has fixed Header formats followed by a 
payload field. There are two defined Header formats for the protocol. The first, the 
"Payload Datagram" is used to convey information and requests from the TCBE to the 
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TCB Extension Server. The second, the "Command Datagram" , is provided to enable the 
TCB Extension Server to control the TCBE State actions and convey information to the 
TCBE. The composition of these datagrams is provided in Appendix C. 
a. Payload Datagram 
The TCBE uses the Payload datagram to make requests of the TCB Extension 
Server and to pass information that the user has entered, such as "Usemame" or 
"Password" to the TCB. fu Version One of the protocol, there are three Payload packets 
defined..for use by the TCBE. They are as follows: 
• Secure Attention Request. The TCBE will generate and 
transmit a Secure Attention Request packet (as described in Section 3.4.1) for 
each use of the Secure Attention Key by the user, regardless of its current 
state. This action will transition the TCBE into State [3] (TP Processing) and 
initialize a Protected Communications Channel or "Trusted Path" to the TCB 
if one does not already exist. 
• Response. The TCBE will generate and transmit a 
Response Packet upon receipt of a Command Datagram packet from the 
TCB Extension Server that requires a response. The TCBE will remain in , 
State [3] (TP Processing) and wait for input from the user. It will then 
generate and transmit a Response Datagram packet (as described in 
Appendix C, Section 3.4.1). 
• PCC Updated. The TCBE will generate and transmit a 
PCC Updated packet (as described in Appendix C, Section 3.4.1) 
following the successful creation of the Protected Communications 
Channel Security Policy Database from the information provided by the 
TCB Extension Server. 
b. Command Datagram 
The TCB Extension Server uses the Command datagram to control the 
actions of the TCBE and to pass information to the user through the TCBE. fu Version 
One of the protocol, the TCB Extension Server uses one of three Response types to pass 
the commands. 
58 
( 1) Response Types 
• No Response. The TCB Extension Server will generate 
and transmit a No Response packet (as described in Section 3.4.2) for 
datagrams when the TCB Extension Server does not require a response. 
The TCB Extension Server will use this response type for commands that 
are directive in nature, such as "RUN" or "LOGOUT" or informational in 
nature, such as "NOOP (No Operation Expected)". 
• Response with Echo. The TCB Extension Server will 
generate and transmit a Response with Echo packet (as described in 
Section 3.4.2) for datagrams when the TCB Extension Server requires a 
response and there is no protection compromise if the user's response is 
echoed to the screen. The TCB Extension Server will use this response 
type for commands that require user input that is not of a private nature, 
such as "USERNAME" or "SESSION LEVEL CHANGE". 
• Response without Echo. The TCB Extension Server will 
generate and transmit a Response without Echo packet (as described in 
Section 3.4.2) for datagrams when the TCB Extension Server requires a 
response and there is a possible protection compromise if the user's 
response is echoed to the screen. This response type will be entered when 
a response is expected from the TCBE and the TCB Extension Server does 
NOT allow the TCBE to display the user's response on the screen. 
(2) Command Selections. Upon selecting the type of response 
required from the Command Datagram, the TCB Extension Server uses the Command 
field to control the actions of the TCBE and to pass information to the user through the 
TCBE. In Version One of the protocol, the TCB Extension Server may use one of seven 
command types. 
• No Operation (NOOP). The NOOP command will cause 
the TCBE to display the received payload to the user. The nature of the 
payload is used to provide the user with an interactive login and session 
negotiation with the TCB. The TCB Extension Server will use this 
command field value to pass information directly to the user without 
TCBE intervention, or interpretation. 
• Logout. The LOGOUT command directs the TCBE to 
purge the existing Operating System and files from the workstation's 
memory and return to an "Idle" state. 
• Run. The RUN command directs the TCBE to transition 
into State [4] (Trusted Session) with a sanitized version of the Operating 





Extension Server will use this command field value to activate a session 
with the TCBE equipped client workstation. 
• Resume. The TCB Extension Server will use the 
RESUME command to re-activate a session with the TCBE-equipped 
client workstation. The RESUME command directs the TCBE to transition 
back into State [4] (Trusted Session) at the current session level. Any 
received payload will be displayed to the user. This command directs the 
TCBE to maintain the original version of the Operating System and return 
to the user's previous session configuration. 
• New. This command provides for a future capability in 
the MLS LAN. The "NEW" command is intended to allow the 
incorporation of an algorithm, which will determine if the client 
workstation's Operating System and memory need be purged. The 
algorithm will perform an evaluation of the user's current sensitivity level 
and the requested new sensitivity level. If the change in session level will 
cause a violation of the security policy through the use of the currently 
running operating system, the system will be purged through a RUN 
command. If the new session level does not violate the security policy, a 
NEW command could be used to change the session, but maintain the 
current operating system. This algorithm is left for future work. 
• Disconnect. The receipt of a DISCONNECT command 
terminates the connection to the TCB Extension Server and returns the 
control of the client workstation to State [1] (Idle). Any received payload 
will be displayed to the user. This command directs the TCBE to terminate 
the client workstation's connection to the TCB. 
• Update PCC. The UPDATE PCC command will direct 
the TCBE to modify the TCBE Security Policy Database with the data 
contained in the payload. Once completed, the TCB Extension Server will 
expect a "PCC Updated" Response packet. 
4. TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol Processing 
The user initiates the TCB-TCBE Connection protocol only through the activation 
of the Secure Attention Key. This action directs the TCBE to establish a Protected 
Communications Channel to the source host running the TCB Extension Server and 
transmit a Secure Attention Request (SAR) Packet. The receipt of a SAR packet, causes 
the TCB Extension Server to transmit a series of NOOP commands to request that the 
user provide a username and password for login. A username prompt will be delivered 
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using a Response with Echo packet, while a password prompt will be delivered using a 
Response without Echo packet. 
If User I&A are successful, the TCB Extension Server will send to the TCBE a 
User Interface Menu as a payload in a Response with Echo packet using the NOOP 
command. The TCBE will display the packet payload to the user. This menu that is 
displayed provides a listing of selections, which can be used to perform "trusted 
processing" operations. The listing includes: 
• Session -This selection provides the user with his current session 
information. 
• Change Session Level - This selection provides the user with an 
interactive exchange with the TCB to negotiate a new Session Level. 
• Change Group -This selection provides the user with an interactive 
exchange with the TCB to negotiate a new Group Setting. 
• Logout - This selection expresses a desire for the User to end his session 
with the MLS LAN. 
• Run- This selection tells the TCB that the User is satisfied with his 
negotiated session and would like to enter Trusted Session Operations. 
In response to the "Session" selection, the TCB Extension server will relay the prompts 
to the user through the TCBE via Response with Echo packets using the NOOP 
command. The TCBE will simply display the information contained in the Command 
datagram payload to the user and wait for the user's response. In response to the "Change 
Session Level" and "Change Group" selections, the TCB Extension Server will enter an 
interactive exchange to determine the session level the user would like to use. The TCBE 
and TCB Extension Server will remain in their current State. This information will be 
presented to the user via Response with Echo packets using the NOOP command. During 
these exchanges, the TCBE will generate a Response packet with the user's selection or 
input in the payload and transmit it to the TCB Extension Server. In response to the 
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"Logout" selection, the TCB Extension Server will issue a Logout command to the TCBE 
via a No Response packet. 
The receipt of a "Run" selection by the TCB Extension Server initiates a process 
to establish a session on the MLS LAN. The TCB Extension Server must first update the 
TCBE's Security Policy Database (SPD). This is conducted via a Response without Echo 
packet using the command "Update PCC". The payload of this datagram will be the 
database infonnation necessary for the TCBE to negotiate future Protected 
Comml!nications Channels at the currently negotiated session level. Once the TCBE has 
completed the update, it will generate and transmit a "PCC Updated" Response packet to 
the TCB Extension Server. Only following the receipt of this datagram will the TCB 
Extension Server issue a "Run" command to the TCBE. The receipt of a "Run" command 
by the TCBE, directs it to purge the client workstation's memory, load a fresh version of 
the Operating System and enter Trusted Operations. At any time during the process 
previously described the user activates the Secure Attention Key, the TCBE will suspend 
the current operation and generate and transmit a Secure Attention Request packet to the 
TCB Extension Server. The TCB Extension Server will in tum, stop its current process 
and return to the User I&A portion of the MLS LAN login. 
If the User I&A is unsuccessful, the TCB Extension Server will send to the TCBE 
a No Response packet containing the Command DISCONNECT. This command will 
direct the TCBE to terminate the connection with the TCB. 
Once the User is conducting Trusted Operations at his negotiated session level, no 
change can be made to this TCB configuration without the activation of a Secure 
Attention Key. The activation of the SAK, will cause the TCBE to transmit a SAR 
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packet, however, since the TCB Extension Server knows that the user is currently logged 
and running valid session, the User Interface Menu, that is sent in response includes an 
additional selection. The Trusted Session Processing menu includes a selection for 
"Resume", which allows the user to return to his previously negotiated session without 
change. 
C. SESSION STATUS PROTOCOL 
1. Overview 
·Following the successful session negotiation by a user into the MLS LAN, the 
TCB Extension Server must create a session database entry through the Session Database 
Server (SDS) that uniquely defines information such as who the user is, from which 
TCBE-equipped workstation the user logged in, and the sensitivity and integrity levels 
assigned to the current session. The integrity of the Session Status Database (SSD) is 
critical to the assurance of the overall LAN and therefore the ability to manipulate 
(read/write) its data must be constrained. The Session Status Protocol is provided as a 
method for the TCB Extension Server, acting as the only TCB entity with both read and 
write access to the SDS, to modify the contents of the SSD. This protocol is also used by 
other TCB entities to verify the session status of MLS LAN users. TCB entities, other 
than the TCB Extension Server are limited to "read only" access. Protection against 
replay and spoofing is provided by the underlying Protected Communications Channel. 
2. TCB Extension Server and Session Database Server States 
a. TCB Extension Server States 
The TCB Extension Server is the only MLS LAN Entity with the 
capability to modify the contents of the database managed by the Session Database 
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Server (SDS). This action can only be taken from three states: State [2] (Connected), 
State [3] (Logged In), and State [5] (Trusted Session Processing) as described in 
Appendix C, Section 3.3. While other TCB entities can use this protocol to query the 
SDS, the state from which their request is issued is not germane to the protocol. The 
transmission of a Session Status Protocol datagram does not constitute a state transition 
for any TCB Entity. 
b. Session Database Server States 
The Session Database Server uses input commands received from the TCB 
Extension Server to modify the status of the session database, however, the configuration 
or States of the Session Database Server are not relevant to this protocol. 
3. Session Status Protocol Datagrams 
The Session Status Protocol has fixed Header formats followed by a payload 
field. There are two defined Header formats for the protocol. The first, the "Request 
Datagram" is used to convey information and requests from a TCB Entity to the Session 
Database Server. The second, the "Reply Datagram", is provided to enable the Session 
Database Server to respond to the TCB Entity's request. The composition of these 
datagrams is provided in Appendix C. 
a. Request Datagram 
All TCB Entities may use the Request datagram to make query (List) 
requests of the Session Database Server. The TCB Extension Server, however may 
additionally use the Request datagram to create, delete, or modify records in the Session 
Status Database. In Version One of the protocol, there are four commands defined for 
use. They are as follows: 
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• List. This command directs the Session Database Server to 
locate and return the attribute values contained in the entry found under 
the listing of the User Session Identification number. The response will 
determine whether the user is currently logged in. 
• Create. This command directs the Session Database Server 
to create a new entry in the database. The TCB Extension Server will use 
the payload field value to pass the user and session information to the 
Session Database Server. 
• Modify. This command directs the Session Database 
Server to modify a current record in the database. The TCB Extension 
Server will use the payload field value to pass the user and session 
information to the Session Database Server. 
• Delete. This command directs the Session Database Server 
to delete a current record in the database. 
b. Response Datagram 
The Session Database Server uses the Response datagram to reply to a 
TCB Entity's Session Status Protocol Request Datagram. In Version One of the protocol, 
there are three Response types defined the Session Database Server to use. They are as 
follows: 
• ACK Response. The Session Database Server will 
generate and transmit an ACK Response packet for Request datagrams 
when the TCB Entity requires only a response determining success. The 
SDS will use this response type for commands that are directive in nature, 
such as "CREATE", "MODIFY" and "DELETE". The payload for an 
ACK RESPONSE packet will contain success verification information for 
the TCB Extension Server. 
• NAK Response. The Session Database Server will 
generate and transmit a NAK Response packet for Request datagrams 
when the TCB Entity requires determination of failure. The SDS will use 
this response type for commands such as "CREATE", "LIST", 
"MODIFY" and "DELETE". The payload for a NAK RESPONSE packet 
may contain information for the TCB Entity concerning the reason for the 
failure. 
• Payload Response. The Session Database Server will 
generate and transmit a Payload Response packet for Request datagrams 
when the TCB Entity requires the information contained in the record. 
This response type will be entered when the SDS has been issued a 
command that requires the return of information contained in a database 
entry. 
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4. Session Status Protocol Processing 
a. Use of the Session Status Protocol by TCB Entities other than the 
TCB Extension Server. 
Upon Receipt of a request for Network Application Services, a TCB 
Entity will generate and transmit a LIST Request packet placing the requestor's TCBE ID 
in the User Session Identification field. This command directs the Session Database 
Server to locate and return the attribute values contained in the entry found under the 
listing of the User Session Identification number. The SDS will transmit this information 
using a "PAYLOAD" Response datagram. The response will determine whether the user 
is currently logged in. If the user is logged in, the TCB entity will continue with the 
connection process as described in Appendix C, Section 5.3.1f, however, a NAK 
Response packet is received from the Session Database Server, the TCB entity will 
terminate the Application Protocol connection to the requesting TCBE-equipped 
workstation. No other Request datagram command selections are available for these 
TCB entities. 
b. Use of the Session Status Protocol the TCB Extension Server. 
The TCB Extension Server will generate and transmit a Request packet 
using the "LIST" command each time it receives a SAR packet. This enables the TCB 
Extension Server to query the Session Database Server to determine if a previous entry 
has been created for the identified TCBE. The response, as previously described, will 
determine whether the user is currently logged in. If the user is logged in, the TCB 
Extension Server will transition to State [3] (Logged in). If, however, a NAK Response 
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packet is received from the SDS, the TCB Extension Server will continue with the User 
I&A session as described in Appendix C, Section 3.5.2.c. and remain in its current State. 
If the user is not logged in, the TCB Extension Server will complete the 
User I&A and it issue a Request packet using the "CREATE" command to instantiate a 
record for the new user. The TCB Extension Server will use this payload field value to 
pass the user and session information to the SDS. This command must be completed prior 
to the TCB Extension Server's transition to State [3] (Logged in). The SDS will generate 
an "ACK" Response packet upon completion. A "NAK" response will cause a 
retransmission. If a response is not returned, the TCB Extension Server will initialize a 
command mechanism to prevent all further connections to the MLS LAN or its services 
until communications to the SDS have been restored. This command mechanism is left 
to future work. 
Once in the "Logged In" State, the TCB Extension Server will allow the 
user to negotiate a session in the MLS LAN through the TCB-TCBE Connection protocol 
as described in section B.4 of this Chapter. Upon the receipt of a TCB-TCBE Protocol 
"Payload" packet containing a "RUN" request, from the TCBE, the TCB Extension 
Server will issue a Request packet using the "MODIFY" command to request the SDS 
update the current session information to the values negotiated during the Trusted Path 
Processing. The SDS will use this command field to change the value of one or more of 
the attributes of a current database entry. The SDS will generate an "ACK" Response 
packet upon completion. A "NAK" response will cause a retransmission. 
At the completion of the user's session, through either a TCB-TCBE 
Protocol "Payload" packet containing a "LOGOUT" request or the issuance of a 
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"DISCONNECT" from the TCB, the TCB Extension Server will issue a Request packet 
using a "DELETE" command. This command requests the SDS remove the User's 
current session record. The SDS will generate an "ACK" Response packet upon 
completion. A "NAK" response will cause a retransmission. The logout of a user does 
not depend on the success of this action. 
D. TCBE-TO-SESSION SERVER CONNECTION PROTOCOL 
1. Overview 
The MLS LAN is intended to provide access to multiple Application 
Layer Protocols such as FfP, HTTP, or IMAP. For Version 1, these application services 
are only accessible to users who have successfully logged in to the MLS LAN and 
established a Session within the TCB. The TCBE-to-Session Server Connection Protocol 
is provided as a method for the TCBE to pass a unique identifier to the Secure Session 
Server (SSS) in order for it to check with the Session Database Server (SDS) for the 
user's session information. The MLS LAN uses the TCBE Identification Number as this 
identifier. The design of this protocol, however, will allow alternate future data, such as 
a unique session token, to be inserted adding flexibility to the MLS LAN. Once the user's 
information is returned from the SDS, the Secure Session Server will establish the proper 
session level connectivity to the appropriate MLS LAN Application Protocol Server 
(APS) as described in [Ref. 13]. If, however, the user is not found by the SDS, the 
connection to the Application Protocol Server will be terminated. 
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2. TCBE and Secure Session Server States 
a. TCBE States 
The TCBE uses this protocol only to pass its unique identifier to the 
Secure Session Server. In the current version of this protocol this action can only be taken 
from one state: State [4] (Trusted Session), however future versions may allow for this 
protocol in State [2] (Unprotected Operations) as described in Appendix C, Section 3.2. 
The use of this protocol does not constitute a state transition for the TCBE. 
b. Secure Session Server States 
A Secure Session Server is created for each higher layer application 
protocol supported by the MLS LAN. Its responsibility is to accept and validate requests 
for access to the particular protocol. The Secure Session Server uses the TCP/IP 
Application Protocol connection request packet from the TCBE equipped client 
workstation to change its configuration. The configuration of the Secure Session Server is 
not relevant to the use of this protocol. 
3. TCBE-to-Secure Session Server Connection Protocol Datagrams 
The TCBE-to-Secure Session Server Connection Protocol has a single fixed 
Header format followed by a payload field. The "Identification Datagram", is provided to 
enable the TCBE to pass its unique TCBE ID to the Secure Session Server. The 
composition of this datagram is provided in Appendix C. 
4. TCBE-to-Secure Session Server Connection Protocol Processing 
Upon the receipt of a "Application Protocol Service Connection Request" 
from a higher layer protocol client residing on the client workstation, the TCBE will 
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generate and transmit an Identification packet to the Secure Session Server which hosts 
that protocol. 
The Secure Session Server does not respond directly to the TCBE using 
this protocol. The Secure Session Server uses the information contained in the TCBE-to-
Session Server datagram to generate and transmit a Session Status Protocol Request 
packet using the "LIST" command to the Session Database Server as described in 
Appendix C, Section 4.5.1. This command will verify the user's current session 
information. Once this information has been verified, the Secure Session Server will 
continue with the Application Protocol Server operations as described in Appendix C, 
Section 4. If the user is not logged in, the Secure Session Server will simply terminate the 
connection to the requesting application. If the Identification datagram is not received, 
the "LIST" command cannot be transmitted and the Secure Session Server cannot 
connect the Application Protocol client request to the Application Protocol Server. This 
action will, in tum cause a time out in the Application Layer, thus requiring a retry. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. MLS LAN PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
1. Previous Efforts 
The MLS LAN Project is an ongoing effort. Most of these efforts have been 
documented in the thesis work of Naval Postgraduate School Graduates [Refs. 28, 29, 
30]. It was the study of these documents, in addition to the exceptional instruction 
provide~ by the NPS CISR staff and study of numerous seminal papers on 
Computer/Network Security, which provided the requisite foundation to understand both 
the magnitude of the endeavor and the structure of the MLS LAN. Of particular note 
were the following documents: 
a. NPS Thesis: Secure Local Area Network Services for a High 
Assurance Multilevel Network, by Susan Bryer Joyner and Scott 
Heller, March 1999 [Ref. 28]. 
This thesis provided the initial design and proof-of-concept 
implementation for a secure LAN that supported the extension of the Trusted Computing 
Base to commercial grade Personal Computers. The culmination of this work furnished 
the NPS laboratory with an initial demonstration prototype of the basic MLS LAN. 
b. NPS Thesis: Design of a High Assurance, Multilevel Secure 
Mail Server (HAMMS), by James Downey and Dion Robb, 
September, 1997 [Ref.29]. 
This thesis provided the requisite design characteristics for a high 
assurance mail server. While the current Application Protocol Server used in the MLS 
LAN project has changed, this work gave an overview of the issues involved in 
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multilevel operations and the incorporation of the Wang Federal XTS-300 high assurance 
server. 
c. NPS Thesis: Analysis for a Trusted Computing Base Extension 
Prototype Board, by Bora Turan March, 2000 [Ref.30]. 
One of the fundamental enabling prerequisites for the MLS LAN project is 
its ability to extend the Trusted Computing Base from the high assurance server to a 
commercial PC. This thesis describes the hardware and software design for a custom 
plug-in board that can both successfully complete the trusted path connection and control 
the client PC. The completion of this work, with its functioning prototype, provided 
confidence in the premise that MLS LAN client PC' s can be connected to the network 
through non-by-passable, tamper resistant network interface cards. 
2. Engineering Team Effort 
The system requirements and protocol design, that are part of this thesis were 
reviewed, discussed, and revised by an engineering team. The composition of the team 
included senior investigators from the NPS CISR staff, the MLS LAN design engineer, 
TCBE hardware/software engineers and the author, as the network/protocol engineer. 
This approach brought to the table decades of focused study in the areas of computer 
security, software and hardware engineering, and project development. 
The engineering team approach was, without a doubt, an important factor in the 
successful development of the three documents that are the appendices in this thesis. 
With this, however, some comments and recommendations should be added to enhance 
future team efforts of this nature. 
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a. Mission and Format. 
The initial meetings of the team were focused on the identification and 
development of protocol specifications for MLS LAN connectivity. Many hours were 
spent in the development of protocol proposals that required design decisions on the 
requirements of the MLS LAN system as a whole. Since there was no previous Systems 
Requirement Document outlining what the MLS LAN was to provide its users or the 
overall architecture of its components, the focus of the team's meetings shifted to its 
development. Concurrently, work continued on a high level analysis of what connection 
protocols would be required to implement the system. These efforts culminated in the 
MLS LAN Project Systems Requirement Document and Protocol High Level Analysis 
Document found in appendices A and B of this thesis. 
A recommendation for future engineering team efforts would be to start 
with the identification of the mission requirements and use these to establish engineering 
goals. 
b. Leadership and Team Composition 
Key to the success of any team effort is the guidance provided by the team 
leader and the ability of the team to cooperatively work toward a collective goal. In this, 
we were blessed with both a strong leader who allowed free and open discussion, and a 
superb group of individuals, whose personalities and expertise complimented one 
another. The ability to professionally discuss, and sometimes argue a point without fear 
of personal ridicule or damaged feelings, creates a healthy work environment and leads to 
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success. This atmosphere is a product of the leadership brought to the team and should be 
emulated in future engineering team meetings. 
c. Documentation 
The documents produced by the engineering team went through many 
revisions. The need for copious notes and comments on modifications cannot be over-
stated. The first documents provided to the team did not contain functional paragraph 
formatting or date/time attributions. This mistake was rectified, making the changes 
easier to track. Additionally, the product developer must provide the team adequate time 
to study proposals before team meetings. Many times, new proposals or changes were 
finalized the night before a meeting. This did not offer the team members sufficient time 
to review the work and slowed the progress of some meetings. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Limitation of Session Sensitivity Levels. 
Each TCBE could be assigned a security rating commensurate with its location or 
use. A security rating would indicate the highest sensitivity level the specific TCBE 
would be allowed to support. This would mean TCBE-equipped workstations located in 
physically secured spaces could be assigned ratings equal to the space, while TCBE-
equipped workstations operating in non-secure surroundings could be assigned lower 
security ratings. The assignment of this security rating would allow the creation of an 
algorithm to enable the TCB to limit the allowable session sensitivity-level to the greatest 
lower bound between the user's clearance and the TCBE security rating. Once the 
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security ratings are assigned, physical control must be provided to TCBEs with high 
ratings. 
2. Acceptance of a Non-TCBE-Equipped Workstation. 
Current versions of the MLS LAN connection protocols require the use of a valid 
TCBE ID to establish a connection to the TCB Extension Server. The intent of the MLS 
LAN Project, however, is to provide flexibility by allowing connections by both TCBE 
and non-TCBE equipped workstations. This will require a modification of the existing 
protoc~~s to use more generic User-Session identification values, such as a token. The 
value must maintain the protection of the unique identification of the TCBE gained by the 
use of the current TCBE ID, but must also support the identification of a non-TCBE-
equipped workstation. 
3. Non-TCBE-Equipped Workstations Access to Application Protocol 
Servers. 
A future goal of the MLS LAN is the ability to support the connection of a 
workstation that is not using TCBE services to a MLS LAN Application Protocol Server 
(APS). This would allow normal commercially procured workstations, or TCBE-
equipped workstations operating in an "Unprotected Operations" mode, to gain access to 
MLS LAN services operating as a system defined anonymous user. 
Additionally, the future MLS LAN may allow the connection to an untrusted 
Application Protocol Server, such as Web or print Server, for use by non-TCB 
authenticated users. The Secure Session Server would require a method to accept 
Network Application Protocol Services requests from workstation/users that have not 
established a session and to pass these on to an untrusted APS. The user would need to 
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be accepted at a system defined low secrecy, low integrity, session sensitivity level. The 
use of untrusted APS would provide a method of login at "system low" that allows the 
TCB Extension Server knowledge of the user login, but not force a purge of the 
Operating System on the client workstation. For example, this would allow a user who is 
operating in the Unprotected Operations State, to access the MLS LAN at the lowest 
possible sensitivity level and utilize print services without a system purge at login. 
Another possible service to be provided in an "Unprotected Operations" mode is 
the coQnection to a Non-MLS LAN Application Protocol Server, such as a commercial 
HTTP Web host (e.g., Yahoo.com). In this situation, an additional Security Policy 
Database and Security Association Database may be required to establish "untrusted" 
(normal) IPSec security associations to commercial sites. 
4. Session Domination Algorithm. 
A future modification to the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol must incorporate a "session 
domination algorithm" to determine if the operating state of the workstation requires 
modification (e.g., if the requested session sensitivity-level dominates the current session, 
the workstation operating system need not be cleared). This algorithm would be 
employed when a user requests a change in session level. The algorithm would perform a 
comparison of the user's current sensitivity level and the requested new sensitivity level. 
If the change in session level would cause a potential violation of the security policy 
through the use of the currently running client PC operating system, the client 
workstation must be purged by using a RUN command. If the new session level does not 
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violate the security policy, a NEW command could be used to change the session, but 
maintain the current operating system. 
5. Protected Channel Initiator 
The Protector Channel Initiator is a user-developed trusted module responsible for 
the creation of the Protected Communications Channel (PCC) between two MLS LAN 
components. This process is a software implementation of Network layer IPSec that will 
be placed into the XTS-300 and the TCBE. The initiator process will enforce a "two-
way" II?:l:ltual hardware authentication between the two connecting entities and provide 
security and integrity protection on all transmitted data. 
6. Distributed Session Database 
Currently the Session Database Server located on a single XTS-300 source host 
maintains the Session Status Database. If the Session Status Database were to be 
distributed throughout all XTS-300 source hosts on the MLS LAN more efficiency may 
be gained in the connections between the TCBE and Application Protocol Servers. This 
approach may also provide support for the use of token-based access. The Session 
Database Server could easily provide the database synchronization required to 
incorporate the distributed implementation of the database. 
7. Session Time Control Mechanism 
One of the protection mechanisms sought for the MLS LAN is the ability of the 
TCB to maintain control over the user's LAN connection. The intent is to enable the 
TCB to confirm that the user is still physically there. This may require the development 
of a mechanism to control the time that a user may remain in a session without the 
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physical activation of the Secure Attention Key. A control protocol mechanism could be 
developed for transmission between the TCB Extension Server and other TCBE entities 
to pass directions, such as a request for a "user initiated SAK". If a Secure Attention 
Request is not returned, the LAN connection could be terminated. This control 
mechanism could also be expanded for use with other events germane to the TCB such 
as: 
• Network administrative control. 
• Network loss or restoration control. 
• User Termination control. (to disconnect some or all 
MLS LAN Services from user). 
8. TCB-TCBE Trusted Path Connectivity 
The pros and cons of a persistent trusted path between the TCBE and the TCB 
Extension Server must be evaluated in depth with respect to the enforcement of the 
security policy by the TCB. 
9. MLS LAN Domain of Interpretation 
The ISAKMP Domain of Interpretation (DOl) does not specifically address 
multilevel security. This DOl may be sufficient to provide the security attributes 
necessary for use in an MLS environment; however, future research may reveal that a 
more specific DOl is needed for the MLS LAN Project. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Multilevel Secure Local Area Network connection framework presented in 
this thesis is intended to provide protected communications between each of the 
components of the MLS LAN to ensure single level users can access multilevel data. 
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Initial user connection to the MLS LAN was described through a Trusted Path or 
Protected Communications Channel, which utilized the Internet Protocol Security 
Standard to sufficiently provide security for data transfer throughout the MLS LAN. A 
specific connection protocol was described to enable the TCB to extend protection and 
control to the TCBE-equipped workstation and enable the user to negotiate access to the 
LAN through the actions of the TCBE. A protocol was described that allows positive 
control of the Session Status Database by the TCB Extension Server, while concurrently 
enabling other TCB Entities query capability. Finally, a protocol was provided that 
enables users operating in trusted sessions to access Network Application Protocol 
Services. 
This framework, coupled with the Systems Requirements Document and Protocol 
High Level Analysis Document included in the appendices, has proven that the MLS 
LAN initiative to extend the TCB to TCBE-equipped commercially procured personal 
computers can securely establish multilevel access across a LAN. I am confident that 
this thesis, in concert with the previous work on MLS hardware and software solutions, 
and ongoing research by the faculty and students at the Naval Postgraduate School will 
culminate in a realistic, workable, and cost effective solution to the Multilevel Secure 
LAN problem. 
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APPENDIX A. MLS LAN SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
This requirements document provides extensive information concerning the 
design requirements for each of the components of the MLS LAN project. It outlines the 
mandated system goals perceived for successful completion of the project and the 
development of an operational multilevel secure local area network. It is understood that 
some of the specified requirements are designated as mandatory to fulfill near-term 
functionality and are to be addressed in the initial design. Other requirements, where 
annotat~~' are considered to be future goals and are recorded to support long-range 
design specifications. This requirements document should provide sufficient detail and 
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The purpose of this System Requirements Document is to define the design 
requirements for the Naval Postgraduate School Center for lnfoSec Studies and Research 
(CISR) Multilevel Secure Local Area Network (MLS LAN) Project. This document is a 
product of a team effort led by Dr. Cynthia Irvine, Director of NPS CISR. The team 
members include: Mr. Timothy Levin, Mr. David Shifflett, Ms. Barbara Pereira, LtCol. 
J.D. Wilson, USMC, and the assistance of Mr. James P. Anderson, of J.P.A. Co. 
1.2 Scope. 
This requirements document provides extensive information concerning the 
design requirements for each of the components of the MLS LAN project. It outlines the 
mandated system goals perceived for successful completion of the project and the 
development of an operational multilevel secure local area network. It is understood that 
some of the specified requirements are designated as mandatory to fulfill near-term 
functionality and are to be addressed in the initial design. Other requirements, where 
annotated, are considered to be future goals and are recorded to support long-range 
design specifications. This requirements document should provide sufficient detail and 
content to assist the design team in specification definition. 
2. The System Overview: 
2.1. MLS LAN System Overview. 
The MLS LAN Project is an effort to provide government and commercial 
organizations with a cost effective, multilevel, easy-to-use office environment leveraging 
existing high assurance technology. The goals of the project are to produce a networking 
environment that provides concurrent high assurance access for network users to data at 
multiple sensitivity levels through the incorporation of inexpensive commercial personal 
computers. 
The proposed systems architecture for the MLS LAN is based on the use of the 
Wang Government Services Incorporated XTS-300™ B3 rated server. [Ref. 1] The 
XTS-300' s multilevel features provide both mandatory and discretionary access controls, 
which "allow separation of users who are at different clearance levels, and prevents a 
lower level user from reading a higher level user's files or data". [Ref. 2] In accordance 
with the TCSEC Class B3 rating requirements, the XTS-300 establishes a "Trusted 
Computing Base" (TCB) that contains all of the Trusted Software Commands, the TCB 
System Services (TSS), and the Security Kernel. It is the last that implements the TCSEC 
defined Reference Monitor concept in the XTS-300 [Ref 3]. The MLS LAN incorporates 
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a "logically isolated and unmistakably distinguishable" trusted communications path 
between the server and its clients through development of a Trusted Computing Base 
Extension (TCBE). The TCBE will provide a trusted network interface entity for 
verifiable expansion of the TCB over the communications path to the client workstation. 
The current hardware solution for the TCBE is to be developed using the Intel I960jx 
processor. The TCBE will dominate all actions of the untrusted workstation and allow 
connectivity into the High Assurance LAN only following the establishment of a trusted 
path. 
2.2 MLS LAN User Description. 
The MLS LAN user is any operator, regardless of authentication, who accesses 
MLS LAN resources or network functionality. A TCB Authenticated user is one who has 
successfully established a TCB-to-User connection and been validated by the TCB for 
operations within the MLS LAN. A Non-TCB Authenticated User, which is a future 
requirement, is one who has not been validated by the TCB. Accountability of Non-TCB 
Authenticated users shall be provided using existing commercial authentication and 
identification mechanisms. 
2.3 Component Descriptions. 
The MLS LAN is comprised of three components (Fig 2.1 ). The principle 
component is the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), which provides an fixed security 
perimeter for MLS LAN operations. Network functionality for access to available 
application software, file transfer, electronic mail, or remote printing is provided by the 
Network Application Protocol Services. Finally, the MLS LAN requires a workstation 
that acts an agent for the User to access any required network functionality. 
2.3.1. Trusted Computing Base. The Trusted Computing Base is an abstraction 
for the collection of elements of a computer system that pertain to the security policy. Its 
aegis encompasses all policy enforcement mechanisms, any auditing (retrieval and 
analysis), identification and authentication, and the interface for security administration. 
2.3.1.1. Trusted Computing Base Services. The services provided by 
the MLS LAN to establish a Class B3 rated Trusted Computing Base were outlined in 
section 2.1 "MLS LAN System Overview". To extend this TCB securely to users 
additional services are required. 
2.3.1.1.1. TCBE Extension Server. The use of the XTS-300 
High Assurance Server enables the MLS LAN to place a trusted daemon process in the 
Operating System Services (OSS) Domain that can provide the protection and 
communications protocols necessary to establish a trusted path between the workstation 
and MLS LAN. This "Server" process is used to extend the TCB perimeter securely over 
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the network to the requesting TCBE equipped workstation. This "Server" process will 
provide the following functionality: user identification and authentication, session 
negotiation, session activation, and session termination. [Ref 5.] 
2.3.1.1.2. Secure Session Server. The Secure Session Server is 
an additional trusted daemon "Server" process contained in the OSS. This process will 
only accept incoming Network Application Protocol Service requests from 
workstations/users that have established a session via the trusted path and the TCB 
Extension Server. Validated requests will be passed on to untrusted Application Protocol 
Servers, operating on behalf of the user, at the user's negotiated session sensitivity level 
[Ref 5.] 
(Future Requirement) The Secure Session Server will accept Network Application 
Protocol Services requests from workstation/users that have not established a session. 
These requests will be passed on to untrusted Application Protocol Servers, operating as a 
system defined anonymous user, at a system defined low secrecy, low integrity, session 
sensitivity level. 
2.3.1.1.3. MLS LAN Session Database Server. The MLS LAN 
requires a trusted database to maintain all pertinent information concerning each unique 
TCB session connection. The Session Database Server must provide protection for 
trusted "read" functionality from all TCB entities and "write" functionality from the 
TCB Extension Server. 
2.3.1.2. Trusted Computing Base Extension. The Trusted Computing 
Base Extension (TCBE) is a hardware-based computer subsystem that is embedded into 
the MLS LAN workstation. The TCBE provides the MLS LAN with a verifiable high 
assurance entity that can be used to extend the TCB. 
2.3.1.3. MLS LAN Connection Protocols. The MLS LAN connection 
protocols define the parameters for initiation, security and communications establishment 
between two or more components of the MLS LAN. 
2.3.2 Network Application Protocol Services. 
The MLS LAN uses the TCPIIP stack to support numerous Application Layer 
Protocol services such as Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Internet Message Access 
Protocol (IMAP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). These services are provided to the 
users through Application Protocol Servers (APS). While use of these application 
services are considered "untrusted" and external to the TCB, their access is controlled 
strictly through the Secure Session Server allowing access to data of multiple sensitivity 
levels. 
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2.3.3 MLS LAN Workstation. 
The MLS LAN workstations are the network computers employed by the user to 
access MLS LAN resources and network functionality. 
r·-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··-··1 
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Figure 2.1 MLS LAN Component Overview 
3. System Requirements: 
3.1. MLS LAN Requirements. 
3.1.1. The MLS LAN shall support multiple simultaneous workstation 
connections. 
3.12. The MLS LAN shall support simultaneous high assurance access for 
unique workstations operating at different sensitivity levels. 
3.1.3. The MLS LAN shall provide access to shared resources, application 
protocol services, and popular application products for both TCB 
Authenticated Users and, in the future, Non-TCB Authenticated Users. 
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3.1.4. The MLS LAN shall provide high assurance connectivity to application 
protocols that give access to multiple levels of data in accordance with 
security policies. 
3.2. Trusted Computing Base Requirements. 
This section elaborates on the requirements for the TCB in total. The overall 
requirements are germane to each of the sub-components while their specific 
requirements are contained in subsequent sections. A abstract depiction of the MLS LAN 
layering is provided in figure 3.1. 
3.2.1. TCB Overall Requirements. 
3.2.1.1 The TCB shall provide a Secure Attention Key (SAK) mechanism 
to invoke a trusted path from workstations to which the TCB has 
been extended. 
3.2.1.2. The TCB shall establish a trusted path communications 
connection between network users and the Trusted Computing 
Base. This trusted path shall be established for initial session 
authentication purposes, such as "login" or for any specified user 
operations that require a trusted path, such as "logout", "set 
session level", downgrade, change user password, etc. 
3.2.1.3. Once the session has been established, the TCB shall not allow 
the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol Channel to be broken without loss of 
network functionality with respect to shared resources, protocol 
services and applications provided by the MLS LAN. 
3.2.1.4. The TCB shall allow the user to change the current session 
sensitivity-level up to the configured maximum for that user. 
3.2.1.5. The TCB shall provide assurance that the security policy will be 
enforced in the presence of malicious software. 
3.2.1.6. The TCB shall provide protection against disclosure and 
modification of information on all communications channels used 
by the network. 
3.2.1.7. The TCB shall control access all devices and networks external to 
theMLS LAN. 
3.2.1.8. (Future Requirement) The TCB shall limit the allowable session 
sensitivity-level to the greatest lower bound between the user's 




















TCB-to-TCBE Protocol f Server 
Protected Communications 
Figure 3.1 TCB Layering Abstractions 
3.2.2. Trusted Computing Base Extension Requirements. 
3.2.2.1. The TCBE shall support the use of Trusted Path communications 
with the TCB for security related operations. 
3.2.2.2. The TCBE shall prevent data retention between session security 
levels and support proper object reuse. 
3.2.2.3. The TCBE shall support a hardware mechanism that has the 
ability to purge all memory between session security levels. 
3.2.2.4. The TCBE shall maintain the ability to reset the host computer 
system. 
3.2.2.5. The TCBE shall support the use of a secure attention key. 
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3.2.2.6. The TCBE shall control the information flow into and out of the 
host computer system. 
3.2.3. MLS LAN Connection Protocol Requirements. 
3.2.3.1. The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol that supports both the 
establishment of a secure interaction communications channel and 
the mutual authentication between two TCB entities. This protocol 
will be known as the "Protected Communications Channel (PCC) 
Protocol". This protocol will establish the security conduit through 
which all other MLS LAN protocols operate. 
3.2.3.2. The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support 
communications between a TCBE equipped workstation and the 
TCB Extension Server. This protocol will be known as the "TCB-
to-TCBE Protocol". 
3.2.3.3. The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support the secure 
transfer of information from the TCB Extension Server to the 
Session Database Server to initialize or modify the data maintained 
on each User Session. This protocol will additionally support the 
query by a TCB Entity to the Session Database Server for 
information concerning a User Session. This protocol will be 
known as the Session Status Protocol. 
3.2.3.4. The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support a TCBE 
equipped workstation connection to a MLS LAN Secure Session 
Server. This protocol is the conduit for application protocols and 
will be known as the "TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol". 
3.2.3.6. (Future Requirement) The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to 
support the connection of a workstation that is not using TCBE 
services to an untrusted Application Protocol Server, e.g., 
INTERNET or WWW. 
3.2.3.7. (Future Requirement) The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to 
support a connection of a workstation that is not using TCBE 
services to a MLS LAN Application Protocol Server. 
3.3. MLS LAN Network Application Protocol Services Requirements. 
3.3.1. The MLS LAN shall support multiple simultaneous accesses to higher 
layer application protocols, e.g., HTTP, IMAP or FfP. 
3.3.2. The MLS LAN Application Protocol Servers shall provide access to 
shared network resources, and popular application products for TCB 
authenticated users. 
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3.3.3. Access to data maintained on the MLS LAN Applications Protocol 
Servers (APS) shall be controlled the through the TCB in accordance with 
the security policy. 
3.3.4. (Future Requirement) The MLS LAN Application Protocol Servers shall 
provide access to shared network resources, and popular application 
products for Non-TCB authenticated users 
3.4. MLS LAN Workstation Requirements. 
3 .4.1. The MLS LAN shall support the use of two configurations of inexpensive 
commercial personal computers: 
3.4.1.1. Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) equipped. 
3.4.1.2. (Future Requirement) Non-TCBE equipped. 
3.4.2. The MLS LAN Workstations shall support up-to-date commercial 
operating systems. 
3.4.3. The MLS LAN TCBE Equipped Workstation shall be "diskless thin-client" 
computers operating under the control of the TCBE.4. MLS LAN 
SYSTEM RESTRICTIONS: 
4. MLS LAN System Restrictions. 
4.1 MLS LAN Restrictions 
4.1.1 The MLS LAN shall support no more than one logged in user per 
workstation at a time. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Definitions. 
A.l. Abbreviations, Acronyms 
APS - Application Protocol Server 
CISR - Center for InfoSec Studies and Research 
FfP - File Transfer Protocol 
HTTP - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
IMAP - Internet Message Access Protocol 
LAN - Local Area Network 
MLS - Multilevel Secure 
NPS -Naval Postgraduate School 
OSS- Operating System Services 
SAK- Secure Attention Key 
TCB - Trusted Computing Base 
TCBE - Trusted Computing Base Extension 
TIC - Trusted Interaction Channel 
TSS - TCB System Services 
TCSEC - Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria 
A.2. Definitions 
A.2.1. Trusted Computing Base: The Trusted Computing Base is 
defined as "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system - including 
hardware, firmware, and software- the combination of which is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more components that together 
enforce a unified security policy over a product or system. The ability of a trusted 
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computing base to correctly enforce a security policy depends solely on the mechanisms 
within the TCB and on the correct input by system administrative personnel of 
parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to the security policy" [Ref 3.] 
A.2.3. Trusted Path: The Trusted Path is defined as "A mechanism by 
which a person at a terminal can communicate directly with the Trusted Computing 
Base. This mechanism can only be activated by the person or the Trusted Computing 
Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted software." [Ref 3.] 
A.2.3. Session: A Session is defined as the period of interaction between 
a user and entities within the MLS LAN following session activation and until session 
termination. Sessions are established or denied based upon based on "attributes such as 
the location or port or access, the user's security attribute (e.g., identity, clearance 
level, integrity level, membership in a role), ranges of time (e.g., time-of-day, day-of-
week, cpJendar dates) or combinations of parameters." Limitations may be placed upon 
user active sessions such as limitations of the number of multiple concurrent sessions or 
session locking based upon inactivity. [Ref 4.] 
A.2.4. TCB Authenticated User: A TCB Authenticated user is one who 
has successfully established a TCB-to-User connection and been validated by the TCB 
for operations within the MLS LAN. 
A.2.5. Non-TCB Authenticated User: A Non-TCB Authenticated user is 
one who has not been validated by the TCB. 
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APPENDIX B. MLS LAN PROTOCOL HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT 
This protocol High Level Analysis document provides extensive information 
concerning the design requirements for each of the six principle connection protocols 
outlined in the System Requirements Document. The MLS LAN shall provide 
connection protocols to support the extension of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of 
the MLS LAN to the user through the Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE). It is 
understood that the first four protocols defined in this document are necessary to fulfill 
near-term functionality and will be addressed in the initial design. Others, when so 
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The purpose of this Protocol High Level Analysis Document is to define the 
protocol design requirements for the Naval Postgraduate School Center for InfoSec 
Studies and Research (CISR) Multilevel Secure Local Area Network (MLS LAN) 
Project. This document is a product of a team effort led by Dr. Cynthia Irvine, Director 
of NPS CISR. The team members include: Mr. Timothy Levin, Mr. David Shifflett, Ms. 
Barbara Pereira, LtCol. J.D. Wilson, USMC, and the assistance of Mr. James P. 
Anderson, of J.P.A. Co. 
1.2. SCOPE. 
This Protocol High Level Analysis document provides extensive information 
concerning the design requirements for each of the six principle connection protocols 
outlined in the System Requirements Document. The MLS LAN shall provide 
connection protocols to support the extension of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of 
the MLS LAN to the user through the Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE). It is 
understood that the first four protocols defined in this document are necessary to fulfill 
near-term functionality and will be addressed in the initial design. Others, when so 
designated, are recorded to support the long-range goals of the completed project. 
2. The System Protocol Overview: 
· 2.1. MLS LAN CONNECTIVITY. 
The MLS LAN Project is an effort to provide government and commercial 
organizations with a cost effective, multilevel, easy-to-use office environment leveraging 
existing high assurance technology. The goals of the project are to produce a networking 
environment that provides concurrent high assurance access for network users to multiple 
sensitivity level data through the incorporation of inexpensive commercial personal 
computers. To ensure positive control over the communications between MLS LAN 
entities, the definition of certain connection protocols is required. An overview of how 
these protocols facilitate the MLS LAN connectivity are illustrated in figure 2.1. 
2.1.1. Transmission Protection. To provide the high assurance required 
throughout the network, the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) must provide protection 
against disclosure and modification of information on all transmissions between 
components of the MLS LAN. This is accomplished through the establishment of a non-
by-passable protected communications channel that provides mutual authentication for 
the two TCB entities and data encryption on all transmissions between them. This 
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protected communications channel (PCC) thus presents the protected conduit through 
which all other MLS LAN protocols may negotiate connectivity. 
MLS LAN Application 
Protocol Services 




2.1.2 Trusted Path Communication. Access to the MLS LAN is controlled 
through the establishment of a session which requires the user to authenticate him (or her) 
self to the Trusted Computing Base. This operation, ~s well as any other security related 
operations between the user and the TCB must be conducted through a Trusted P.ath. This 
requirement is predicated in the Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
section 3.3.2.1.1 (Trusted Path) which states: 
"The TCB shall support a trusted communications path between itself and users 
for use when a positive TCB-to-user connection is required (e.g., login, change 
subject security level). Communications via this trusted path shall be activated 
exclusively by a user of the TCB and shall be logically isolated and 
unmistakably distinguishable from other paths" [Ref 1.] 
It is also required of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation Version 2.1, under the Trusted Path class (FfP). In general, the Common 
Criteria states: 
"Absence of a trusted path may allow breaches of accountability or access 
control in environments where untrusted applications are used. These 
applications can intercept user-private information such as passwords, and use 
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it to impersonate other users. As a consequence, responsibility for any system 
actions cannot be reliably assigned to an accountable entity. Also, these 
applications could output erroneous information on an unsuspecting user's 
display, resulting in subsequent user actions that may be erroneous and may 
lead to a security breach." [Ref 2.] 
Specifically, the Common Criteria designates a Trusted Path family (FTP _TRP) 
for communications between the user and the TCB for use during all security related 
operations dealing with the establishment, modification and termination of a session. 
"This family defines the requirements to establish and maintain trusted 
communications to and from users and the TSF [Target of Evaluation Security 
Functions]. A trusted path may be required for any security-relevant 
interaction. Trusted path exchanges may be initiated by a user during any 
interaction with the TS, or the TSF may establish communications with the user 
J!.ia a trusted path." [Ref 2.] 
The MLS LAN must provide a protocol to support these "Trusted Path" security 
related operations conducted between a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) 
equipped workstation and the TCB. These communications are supported by the TCB-to-
TCBE connection protocol. 
TCB Entity 
• Connection Request 
• Encryption Applied 
• Entity Hardware I & A 
• Session Encryption 
request 




Security Setup Request 
Session Data 
TCB Entity 
• Entity Hardware I & A 
• Session Encryption 
setup 
• Protected Communication 
Channel Established 
I Protected Communications Channel I 
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• Session Change 
• Session level 
• Integrity Change 
• Integrity level 
• Password Change 




I Trusted Path Operations I 
Figure 2.3 Trusted Path Operations conducted through 
the TCB-To-TCBE Protocol Connection 
2.1.3 TCB Session Status Maintenance. The TCB will contain a trusted 
database server that is responsible for the maintenance of unique information pertinent to 
all MLS LAN sessions established on the network. The TCB Extension Server utilizing 
the Session Status Protocol will make all changes and modifications through this Session 
Database Server. 
2.1.4 Network Application Services. Following session establishment, the 
MLS LAN user will be authorized to conduct normal operations 
within the MLS LAN environment. This will include connectivity 
to the Network Application Protocol Services (e.g., HTTP, IMAP, 
FTP, etc.) supported by the LAN. To ensure the security ofthe 
network services connections, application service requests are 
transmitted from the client to the Secure Session Server handling 
communications from clients. The Session Server will validate the 
user's session sensitivity level and access. If the user is authorized, 
the Session Server will create a socket interface to the Application 
Protocol Server and allow application operations to commence. [Ref 
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• Change Current 
User Session 
Information 
• Delete User 
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I Modification of MLS LAN Information I 
Figure 2.4 TCB Entity Information Modification through 
the Session Status Protocol Connection 
ensures the user is presented services commensurate with the current session established 
by the TCB. This interaction will be provided by the TCBE-to-Session Server 
connection protocol. 
2.1.5. Application Services Validation. When a service request for access to a 
MLS LAN Application Protocol Server (APS) is received, a way must be provided to 
validate the client's current session sensitivity level and service authorization. This 
validation process must be accomplished prior to the Secure Session Server allowing 
application operations. The Secure Session Server requires a connection protocol 
between itself and the TCB Session Status Database in order to compare the information 
contained in the user's service request and the user's security information maintained by 
the TCB. The Client Application Services Validation Protocol supports these 
communications. 
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TCBE Secure Session Application 
Equipped Workstation Server Protocol 
Server 
• User 
• Service Authorizatim 
Request 







I Application Service Operations I 
Figure 2.5. Network Application Services Connection Establishment 
through the TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol 
Secure Session 
Server 




I Session Information Query via Session Status Protocol! 
Figure 2.6 Application Services are validated 
through the Session Status Protocol 
105 
2.1.6. Future Requirements. Future requirements for the MLS LAN involve the connection of 
workstations that are not using the services of a TCBE. Protocols will be required for the connection 
of these computers to untrusted Application Protocol Servers (e.g., external HTTP Servers) and to 
MLS LAN Application Protocol Servers. 
3. Connection Protocol Requirements : 
3.1. Protected Communications Channel (PCC) Protocol Requirements. 
3.1.1 The PCC Protocol shall enforce mutual "two-way" hardware identification 
and authentication between two TCB entities prior to the establishment of 
trusted path communications the trusted communications. 
3.1.2 The PCC Protocol shall incorporate security and integrity protection 
through encryption and verification on all data transmitted between MLS 
LAN entities. 
3.1.3. All connection protocols, e.g., TCBE-to-Session Server, TCB-to-TCBE, 
shall only be initiated following the establishment of a PCC between the 
two MLS LAN entities. 
3.2. TCB-to-TCBE Connection Protocol Requirements. 
3.2.1 The TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall only be initiated through a request for 
"secure attention" from the user. 
3.2.2 The TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall support the trusted path security related 
operations necessary to establish the initial session such as "login" and 
"user identification and authentication" or for any specified user 
operations that require a trusted path, such as "logout", "set session 
level", downgrade, change user password, etc. 
3.2.3. The TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall allow establishment of a session only 
following activation by the user. 
3.2.4 The TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall control the actions of the TCBE through 
the specific TCBE state commands. 
3.2.5 (Future Requirement) The TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall incorporate a 
"session domination algorithm" to determine if the operating state of the 
workstation requires modification (e.g., if the requested session 
sensitivity-level dominates the current session, the workstation operating 
system need not be cleared). 
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3.3. Session Status Protocol Requirements. 
3.3.1. The Session Status Protocol shall be initiated for every instantiation or 
modification of any information concerning the status of a user's current 
session. 
3.3.2. The Session Status Protocol shall support trusted communications between 
the TCB Extension Server and the Session Database Server, which is 
responsible for the maintenance of user-session security information. 
3.3.3 The Session Status Protocol shall support the encapsulation of session 
information, such as TCBE Identification Number, User Identification, 
Current Session Level, etc. 
3.4 ... TCBE-to-Session Server Connection Protocol Requirements. 
3 .4.1. The TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol shall only be initiated following the 
establishment of an Authorized Session between the client workstation 
and the TCB. 
3.4.2. The TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol shall support the encapsulation of 
information from the client workstation necessary for the identification 
and validation of the user's session sensitivity level and application 
service request. 
3.4.3. The TCBE-to Session Server Protocol shall allow communications 
between a client and an MLS LAN Application Protocol Server only 
following positive validation of the user's session sensitivity level and the 
authorization for the specific application service. 
3.5. Future Connection Protocol Requirements. 
3.5.1. To be Defined. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Definitions. 
A.l. Abbreviations, Acronyms 
APS - Application Protocol Server 
CISR - Center for InfoSec Studies and Research 
FfP _TRP- Common Criteria Trusted Path Family 
FfP - File Transfer Protocol 
HTTP- Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
IMAP - Internet Message Access Protocol 
LAN - Local Area Network 
MLS - Multilevel Secure 
NPS -Naval Postgraduate School 
SAK- Secure Attention Key 
TCB - Trusted Computing Base 
TCBE - Trusted Computing Base Extension 
TCSEC - Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria 
PCC - Trusted Interactive Channel 
TSF - Target of Evaluation Security 
A.2 Definitions 
A.2.1. Trusted Computing Base: The Trusted Computing Base is 
defined as "The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system -
including hardware, firmware, and software- the combination of which is 
responsible for enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more 
components that together enforce a unified security policy over a product or system. 
The ability of a trusted computing base to correctly enforce a security policy 
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depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct input by 
system administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to 
the security policy" [Ref 1.] 
A.2.3. Trusted Path: The Trusted Path is defined as "A mechanism by 
which a person at a terminal can communicate directly with the Trusted Computing 
Base. This mechanism can only be activated by the person or the Trusted Computing 
Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted software." [Ref 1.] 
A.2.3. Session: A Session is defined as the period of interaction between 
a user and entities within the MLS LAN following session activation and until session 
termination. Sessions are established or denied based upon based on "attributes such as 
the location or port or access, the user's security attribute (e.g., identity, clearance 
level, integrity level, membership in a role), ranges of time (e.g., time-of-day, day-of-
week, cqlendar dates) or combinations of parameters." Limitations may be placed upon 
user active sessions such as limitations of the number of multiple concurrent sessions or 
session locking based upon inactivity. [Ref 2.] 
A.2.4. TCB Authenticated User: A TCB Authenticated user is one who 
has successfully established a TCB-to-User connection and been validated by the TCB 
for operations within the MLS LAN. 
A.2.5. Non-TCB Authenticated User: A Non-TCB Authenticated user is 
one who has not been validated by the TCB. 
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APPENDIX C. MLS LAN CONNECTION FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT 
This document provides an overview of the connection protocols required to 
establish a session and operate within the MLS LAN. Its intent is to provide a coherent 
description of the datagram formats and state transitions used to communicate within the 
MLS LAN. This document is in support of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Summary of Contents of the Document 
The MLS LAN Project incorporates specific connection protocols to provide 
communications between the MLS LAN components. This framework provides 
an overview of these protocols with respect to the information contained in their 
defined datagrams and how the information that is passed is used by the 
components to effect state transitions. This document does not address all aspects 
of the MLS LAN architecture. Subsequent documents and established Requests 
For Comments (see Section 1.3) will address the architectural details of a more 
advanced nature. 
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, 
SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when 
they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 
[BRA97]. 
1.2 Terminology 
APS - Application Protocol Server: An untrusted, industry standard application 
protocol server that provides higher layer application services to MLS LAN 
users. 
MLS- Multilevel Secure: Computer system[s] containing information with 
different sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with 
different security clearances and need-to-know, but prevents users from 
obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization. 
NPS -Naval Postgraduate School 
PCC - Protected Communications Channel: An IPSec secured conduit through 
which all other MLS LAN connection protocols operate. 
PCI - Protected Channel Initiator: A trusted process within the network layer of 
MLS LAN high assurance servers and TCBEs that provides security services 
to create a Protected Communications Channel. 
SAK- Secure Attention Key: A specified key[s] that when activated will cause a 
TCBE-equipped MLS LAN workstation to disconnect with all untrusted 
applications and connect to the TCB. 
SDS - Session Database Server: A trusted process within the MLS LAN TCB that 
manages the session status data for all users logged into the MLS LAN. 
· SSS - Secure Session Server: A trusted process within the MLS LAN TCB that 
provides connectivity for users to Application Protocol Servers. 
TCB -Trusted Computing Base: A Trusted Computing Base is the collection of 
security-related elements of a computer system that is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy. 
TCBE - Trusted Computing Base Extension: An high assurance enhanced 
network interface card (NIC) that is installed into the MLS LAN workstation 
to support the extension of the TCB. 
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TCB Extension Server- Trusted Computing Base Extension Server: A trusted 
process within the MLS LAN TCB that conducts the user identification and 
authentication (I&A) and session negotiation necessary to access the MLS 
LAN. 
Workstation - MLS LAN Client Workstation: A commercially personal 
computer. 
1.3 Related Documents 
As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed information as to the 
specifics of the MLS LAN architecture, specifications and requirements. 
Additionally, as the Protected Communications Channel is constructed using the 
IPSec standard, it refers to the following documents and RFCs. 
a. MLS LAN system requirements - "MLS LAN System Requirements 
Document" [WILOOa]. 
b. MLS LAN protocol high level analysis - "MLS LAN Protocol High 
Level Analysis Document" [WilOOb]. 
c. MLS LAN Draft Design Document [ShifOO] 
d. IPSec architecture- "IP Security Document Roadmap" [TDG97], 
"Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [KA98a ]. 
e. Security protocols - RFCs describing the Authentication Header (AH) 
[KA98b] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [KA98c]. 
f. Algorithms for authentication and encryption - a separate RFC for 
each algorithm. 
g. Automatic key management - RFCs on "The Internet Key Exchange" 
(IKE) [HC98], "Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol" (ISAKMP) [MSST97], and "The Internet IP Security 
Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [Pip98]. 
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2. The MLS LAN Protected Communications Channel Protocol 
2.1 Overview 
The Protected Communications Channel protocol is used to establish the security 
conduit through which all other MLS LAN protocols must operate. The Protected 
Communications Channel is created through the use of IP layer security as 
defined in the IP Security Standard for the Internet (See Section 1.3 for pointers to 
the references). The channel provides the MLS LAN with a trusted channel that 
enforces a "two-way" mutual hardware authentication between the two 
connecting entities and provides security and integrity protection on all 
transmitted data. The use of this channel also provides some fault tolerance 
protection in the event of component loss, as the communications between the 
two Protected Communications Channel connected entities will cease, but the 
gyerall network will not be affected. 
Since the MLS LAN utilizes the IPSec Standard to provide the framework for this 
channel, this document does not attempt to describe its architecture or 
mechanisms. Information of these topics can be found in the many RFCs that 
describe IPSec. Additionally, the specific design of the Protected 
Communications Initiator and data structures necessary for IPSec implementation 
in the MLS LAN have y~t to be finalized. For this reason, the subsequent sections 
will, provide an approach to be taken in the application of IPSec in the MLS LAN 
to create a Protected Communications Channel. 
2.2 Logical Placement of MLS LAN IPSec 
[KA98a] describes three common ways in which IPSec can be implemented in 
hosts, routers and security gateways. 
a. Integration into the native IP layer implementation of the host. This 
requires access to the IP source code for the entity that is to use IPSec. 
b. "Bump-in-the-Stack" (BITS) implementation places the IPSec 
underneath an existing implementation of the IP protocol stack 
between the native IP and the local network drivers. This 
implementation does not require access to the IP source code utilized 
in the host. 
c. "Bump-in-the-Wire" (BITW) implementation places an outboard 
crypto processor that provides the IPSec security services. 
The MLS LAN presently utilizes the Wang Government Services, Inc. XTS-
300™ high assurance server as its source host and has created a prototype TCBE 
utilizing the Intel™ i960 processor. To maintain simplicity ofthe XTS-300 
security kernel, it is recommended that the MLS LAN implement IPSec in a BITS 
configuration and create the Protected Communications Initiator as user defined 
trusted code to be controlled by the security kernel. 
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2.3 IPSec Security Policy for the MLS LAN 
Each connection to the MLS LAN TCB must be encrypted with an algorithm that 
is suitable to protect the transmitted information. The Security Manager is 
responsible for ensuring that the strength of the assigned encryption mechanisms 
are sufficient to protect the given sensitivity level. Once assigned, the TCB will 
maintain a virtual table that maps the available encryption transforms with the 
sensitivity levels they can support. When encrypted, the information is considered 
to be safe for transmission across any medium until it reaches its intended 
recipient. The recipient's act of decryption once again transforms the information 
into a sensitive form. IPSec provides a mechanism through the Security Policy 
Database and Security Association Database to segregate the application of 
protection based upon a set of given attributes [KA98a]. The MLS LAN Security 
Manager will create a listing of the specific security parameters that a Protected 
Communications Channel must enforce for connection to each of the MLS LAN 
entities. These security parameters will be mapped to the listing of available MLS 
LAN session levels enabling the TCB Extension Server to know the Security 
Policy Database (SPD) assignments for each session level. 
The initial Security Policy Database of the TCBE will be placed in non-volatile 
memory, established by the Security Manager with a single entry: to apply 
security to connect to the TCB Extension Server and disallow al! other 
connections. Once a session has been established, the TCB Extension Server will 
update the TCBE SPD with the security connection information commensurate 
with the sensitivity level negotiated for the session. From this Security Policy 
Database, the TCBE will correctly negotiate all other connections to MLS LAN 
hosts utilizing the standard Security Association setup of ISAKMP [MSST97]. 
Additional encryption algorithms or transforms can be developed to provide 
higher levels of encryption, e.g., NSA approved Type I encryption, for use on the 
MLS LAN. This remote management of the security policy of IPSec is available 
only because the MLS LAN TCBE can create the initial Protected 
Communications Channel at system high through the non-volatile Security Policy 
Database placed on the TCBE. 
A future requirement for the MLS LAN allows a TCBE-equipped workstation to 
operate as a Non-MLS LAN workstation, e.g., connect to untrusted protocol 
servers without first connecting to the MLS LAN TCB. In this situation, an 
additional Security Policy Database and Security Association Database may be 
required to establish "untrusted" (normal) IPSec security associations to 
commercial sites. The design and implementation of these mechanisms is left to 
future work. 
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2.4 IPSec Key Management for the MLS LAN 
The MLS LAN will use the standard Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [HC98] to 
define a key exchange and to negotiate security services to be provided for each 
Protected Communications Channel. IKE uses a predefined domain of 
interpretation (DOl) to outline the required and optional attributes that are 
negotiated during the phase two exchanges. Currently the DOl is written 
specifically for use with the ISAKMP [Pip98]. This DOl may be sufficient to 
provide the security attributes necessary for use in an MLS environment, 
however, future research may discover that a specific DOl is needed for the MLS 
LAN Project. 
2.5 MLS LAN Protected Communications Channel Processing 
The first Protected Communications Channel established must be a connection 
between the TCBE-equipped workstation and the source host running the TCB 
Extension Server process. This is initiated by the TCBE once the user requests 
attention from the TCB by activating a SAK. The PCI process on the TCBE will 
use the initial Security Policy Database setting to establish the IKE phase one 
exchanges and establish a secure and authenticated communications channel 
between the TCBE and the TCB Extension Server host. Once the IKE security 
association (SA) has been established, the phase two negotiations can then be sent 
to generate the appropriate incoming and outgoing IPSec SAs. This exchange 
effectively negotiates the specific AH and ESP selectors required for each SA. 
During these exchanges, the selectors are outlined for the unique SA and each 
entity records the SA information into its Security Association Database under a 
unique Security Parameter Index. 
Once the Protected Communications Channel is established between the TCBE 
and the TCB Extension Server, the user will be allowed to login to the MLS LAN 
and negotiate a session. If the session establishment is successful, the TCB 
Extension Server will issue a "PCC Update" command and transfer the 
appropriate session level Security Policy data to the TCBE for inclusion in its 
Security Policy Database, as well as make available in the SPD the entries for 
communicating with other MLS LAN Components, e.g., Application Protocol 
Servers. 
From this point, the user is logged in and operating on the MLS LAN at the 
negotiated session level. As application protocol services are requested, the TCBE 
Protected Communications Initiator will use the same method as above to create a 
separate Protected Communications Channel to the source host that supports the 
requested application protocol server. 
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3. TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
The TCB-TCBE Connection protocol is used to provide the Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB) with a method to conduct security related operations along a trusted 
path. This protocol is used by the TCBE as a method to gain secure attention from 
and to respond to the commands of the TCB. The protocol also provides the TCB 
Extension Server with a method to control the actions of the TCBE through the 
use of specific TCBE state commands. The TCB-TCBE Connection protocol will 
only be initiated through a request for "secure attention" from the user. 
Protection against replay and spoofing is provided by the underlying Protected 
Communications Channel. 
3.2 TCBE States 
The TCBE will use input such as the activation of the Secure Attention Key or 
Commands received from the TCB Extension Server to change its configuration. 
This configuration is commonly referred to as the current state of the TCBE. This 
section will describe the TCBE allowable states and the values of the 
corresponding state variables. 
3.2.1 TCBE State Variables 
The TCBE has 3 different state variables, or indicators as shown in Table 1. The 
variable "Power" indicates that the TCBE is powered and active. The variable 
"Trusted Path Operations" represents connectivity with the TCB and the 
negotiation of a secure session. The variable "Client OS Loaded" indicates that 
the client workstation's memory has been purged and a fresh copy of the 
operating system has been loaded. This provides a total of 23 or 8 possible states. 
Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
Trusted Path Operations Yes/No TPO 
Client OS Loaded Yes/No OS 
Table 1. TCBE State Variables 
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3.2.2 TCBE Disallowed States 
The following states are disallowed, meaning there is no way to transition into the 
state. These occur when the system power is 'Off, and any other state is 'Yes'. 
There are a total of 3 disallowed states as shown in Table 2. 
Power TPO OS Reason for disallowed state 
Off Yes No No TPO w/o Power 
Off No Yes No 0/S w/o Power 
Off Yes Yes No TPO or 0/S w/o Power 
Table 2. TCBE Disallowed States 
3.2.3 -TCBE Allowable States 
There are a total of five allowable states as shown in Table 3. In the case of the 
activation of a SAK from State [2], where the 0/S might have been previously 
loaded, the TCBE will purge the previous copy and reload the 0/S following a 
successful login and transition to State [ 4]. If the login is unsuccessful the TCBE 
should return to its previous state (State [2]). The TCBE States are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Future work should include a method of login at "system low" that allows the 
TCB Extension Server knowledge of the user login but not force a purge of the 
0/S. For example, this would allow a user who as been using a workstation in an 
unprotected mode, to access the MLS LAN at the lowest possible sensitivity level 
and utilize print services without a system purge at login. 
State Number Power TPO OS Name 
0 Off No No Power Off 
1 On No No Idle 
2 On No Yes Untrusted Operations 
3 On Yes No Trusted Processing 
4 On Yes Yes Trusted Session 
Table 3. TCBE Allowable States 
3.3 TCB Extension Server States 
The TCB Extension Server will use input such as the receipt of a Secure Attention 
Request, or response payload type received from the TCBE to change its 
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configuration. This configuration is commonly referred to as the current state of 
the TCB Extension Server. This section will describe the TCB Extension Server 
allowable states and the values of the state variables for each. 




•RE(NOOP) (Session) I Display TP Meno 
•RE(NOOP) (SL) I Display TP Menu 
•RE(NOOP)(SG) I Display TP Menu 
•RE(NOOP) (Username) I Display TP Prompt 
•RWOE(NOOP) (Password) I Display TP Prompt 
•RWOE(UPDATE PCC)I PCC Update 
•Ul(SAK) I SAR 
NR(Disconnect)/Purge OS 
Ul(Unprotected 
Mode Selected) I OS Loa 
•NR(RUN) I Purge- Load New OS 
•NR(NEW)!Purge -Load New OS 
•NR(RESUME) I NO"E 
Ul(SAK)ISAR 
• A Power off from any State 
returns to State 0. 
• A logout or disconnect command 
transitions to State I. 
• An error received from any state 
will return the TCBE to State I. 
•State I ,2, 3,4 - TCBE failure 
•State 3,4 - PCC Lost 
• A transition between states is depicted 
as an input command "s" followed by 
the TCBE output "r" such that a 
successful transition is described by: 
State Q sir State Q • 
Legend: 
TP: Trusted path 
(<.g .. TPM<niL TP Prompt) 
SAK: Secure Attention Key 
SAR: Secure Attention Request 
NOOP: No Operation Required 
OS: Operating Systt!m 
PL: Payload Datagram Typ< 
NR: No Response Packet 
RE: Response~'/ Echo Pocket 
RWOE: Respon,,.e W/0 Echo Packet 
1: User Input 
Figure 1. TCBE State Diagram for TCB-TCBE Protocol 
3.3.1 TCB Extension Server State Variables 
The TCB Extension Server has 5 different state variables, or indicators as shown 
in Table 4. The variable "Power" indicates that the TCB Extension Server is 
powered and active. The variable "Connected to TCBE " represents logical 
connectivity with the TCBE. The variable "User Logged in" indicates that the 
User has successfully completed I&A within the TCB. The variable "Session 
Operations" indicates that the User has successfully negotiated a session security 
level within the TCB. The variable "Level Changed" indicates that the User has 
changed his session level within the TCB. This provides a total of 25 or 32 
possible states. 
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Description Values Abbreviation 
Power On/Off Power 
Connected to TCBE Yes/No Connect 
User Logged in Yes/No Log 
Session Operations Yes/No Session 
Level Change Yes/No Level 
Table 4. TCB Extension Server State Variables 
3.3.2 TCB Extension Server Disallowed States 
The following states are disallowed, meaning there is no way to transition into the 
state. These occur when the system power is 'Off, and any other state is 'Yes'. 
This accounts for 15 of the possible states. The reason for the other disallowed 
states is presented in Table 5. There are a total of 26 disallowed states. 
Power Connect Log Session Level Reason for disallowed state 
Off Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No No Power: Total States 
disallowed is 15 
On No No No Yes No Level w/o Connection 
On No No Yes No No Session w/o Connection ; 
On No No Yes Yes No Session or Level w/o 
Connection 
On No Yes No No No Log w/o Connection 
On No Yes No Yes No Log or Level w/o Connection 
On No Yes Yes No No Log or Session w/o 
Connection 
On No Yes Yes Yes No Log, Session, or Level w/o 
Connection 
On Yes No No Yes No Level w/o Login 
On Yes No Yes No No Session w/o Login 
On Yes No Yes Yes No Session or Level w/o Login 
On Yes Yes No Yes No Level w/o Session 
Table 5. TCB Extension Server Disallowed States 
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3.3.3 TCB Extension Server Allowable States 
State 
Of the original 32 possible states, 26 cannot be reached. This leaves a total of 6 
possible states for the TCB Extension Server as shown in Table 6. The TCB 
Extension Server state diagram is depicted in Figure 2. 
Number Power Connect Log Session Level Name 
0 Off No No No No Power Off 
1 On No No No No Idle 
2 On Yes No No No Connected 
3 On Yes Yes No No Logged in 
-p··· 
4 On Yes Yes Yes No Running 
5 On Yes Yes Yes Yes Trusted Session 
Processing 
Table 6. TCB Extension Server Allowable States 
3.4 TCBE-to-TCB Extension Server Protocol Datagram Format 
There are two defined datagram formats for the protocol. The first, shown in 
Figure 3, is the "Payload" datagram used to convey information and requests from 
the TCBE to the TCB Extension Server. The second, shown in Figure 4, is the 
"Command" datagram provided to enable the TCB Extension Server to control 
the TCBE State actions and convey information to the TCBE. 
3.4.1 TCBE to TCB Extension Server Datagram Field Descriptions 
The following subsections define the fields that comprise the TCBE-to-TCB 
Extension Server Datagram or "Payload Datagram" as depicted in Figure 3. All 
fields described are mandatory, i.e., they are always present in the TCB-TCBE 
Connection Protocol. 
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TCB Extension Server States for TCB-TCBE Framework 
• A Power off from any State 
returns to State 0. 
• A logout or disconnect command 
transitions to State I. 
• A transition between states is 
depicted as a TCBE input 
command "s" followed 
by the TCB Ext Ser. output 
"r'' such that a successful 
transition is described by: 
State Q sir State Q '. 
Power off I None 
Power on I None 
• The information within the parenthesis denotes the 
contents of the payload sent to the TCBE. 
• All inputs are from the TCBE 
with the exception of the Power Off. 
• All outputs are datagrams sent 
to the TCBE with the exception of"none". 
ugend: 
PCC: Protected Communications Channel 
SAR: &cure Attention Requ.st T)pe 
PL· Payload Datagram Type 
NOOP: No Operation Required 
OS: Optrating System 
SL· Session level Change 
SG: Group uvel Change 
NR: No Response Packet 
RE: R.sponse ..-!Echo Packet 
RWOE: Response W/0 Echo Packe 
•PL(Se,..ion) I RE(NOOP) (Session I 
•PL(SL) I RE(NOOP) (Level Change Prompt) 
•PL(SG) I RE(NOOP) (Group Change Prompt) 
•PL(RUN) I UPDATE PCC 
•SAR I RE(NOOP) (User Interface Menu) 
PCC Updatedf NR(RUN) 
PCC Updated I NR(RESUME) 




Good User I&A Input I 
RE(NOOP) (User Interface Menu) 
•PL(Se,..ion) I RE(NOOP) 
(S.,..ion Information) 
•PL(SL) I RE(NOOP) 
(Level Change Prompt) 
•PL(SG) I RE(NOOP) 
(Group Change Prompt) 
•PL(RUN)I 
RWOE(UPDATE PCC) 
•SAR I RE(NOOP) 
(User Interface Menu) 
Figure 2. TCB Extension Server States for TCB-TCBE Framework 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCB Identifier HEADER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
IVersioniPayload I Payload I RESERVED I Number Type Length 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I PAYLOAD I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 3. TCBE-to-TCB Extension Server Payload Datagram Format 
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a. TCB Identifier Header. 
This is a 32-bit value that identifies the TCBE that created the packet. This 
will be used by the TCB to facilitate Hardware Identification and 
Authentication. 
b. Version Number Field. 
The Version Number field is a 4-bit value that identifies to the version of the 
MLS LAN Protocol employed. The value in this field for the Version 1 of this 
protocol will be set to 1. 
c. Payload Tvoe. 
This is a field is a 4-bit value that identifies the type of payload contained in 
the datagram. The value of this field is chosen from the listing below. 16 
payload types are possible, however, in the current version only 3 are defined. 
• Value 0 -- Secure Attention Request 
• Value 1 -- Response 
• Value 2- PCC Updated 
d. Payload Length: 
This field is an 8-bit field specifying the length of the payload in 32 bit 
words. 
e. Reserved: 
This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It should be ignored by the 
receiving TCB Entity, but is best set to "zero". 
f. Payload: 
This is a variable length field that contains the data to be sent to the TCB 
Extension Server, typically, this will be the input from the user. The payload 
may be padded with "zeros" to fill up the last 32-bit word. 
3.4.2 TCB Extension Server to TCBE Datagram Field Descriptions 
The following subsections define the fields that comprise the TCB Extension 
Server-to-TCBE datagram or "Command datagram" as depicted in Figure 4. The 
TCB Identifier, Version Number, Payload Length and Reserved fields are the 
same as described in Section 3.4.1 and will not be repeated here. All fields in the 
datagram, however are mandatory, i.e., they are always present in the TCB-TCBE 
Connection Protocol. 
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0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCB Identifier HEADER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
IVersion,ResponseiCommandl Payload I RESERVED I Number Type I I Length I I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I PAYLOAD I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+~+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 4. TCB Extension Server to TCBE Command Datagram Format 
a. Response Type: 
This is a field is a 4-bit value that identifies the type of response that the TCB 
Extension Server will expect in response to the datagram. The value of this 
field is chosen from the listing below. 16 response types are possible, 
however, in the current version only 3 are defined. 
• Value 0-- No Response 
• Value 1 -- Response with Echo 
• Value 2 -- Response without Echo 
b. Command: 
c. 
This field is a 4-bit value that identifies the command that the TCB Extension 
Server is issuing to the TCBE. The value of this field is chosen from listing 
below. 16 command types are possible, however, in the current version only 7 
are defined. 
• Value 0 -- NOOP 
• Value 1 --RUN 
• Value 2 -- NEW 
• Value 3- PCC UPDATE 
• Value 4-- RESUME 
• Value 5-- LOGOUT 
• Value 6 --DISCONNECT 
Payload: 
This is a variable length field that contains the data to be presented to the User 
or information to update the TCBE itself. For example, the RUN or LOGOUT 
commands may use the payload to pass confirmation information to the user, 
while the PCC UPDATE command uses the payload to pass Protected 
Communications Channel Database updates to the TCBE. ·The payload may 
be padded with "zeros" to fill up the last 32-bit word. 
3.4.3 TCBE-to-TCB Extension Server Protocol Datagram Packaging. 
The TCBE and TCB Extension Server will generate one of the types of TCB-
TCBE datagram packets described in Sections 3.4.1 or 3.4.2 for all secure 
operation communications within the TCB. The datagram will be created by 
either the TCBE or TCB Extension Server and passed to the lower layers 
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protocols for transmission to the other entity. Since the protocol is created using 
fixed fields, the value in these datagram fields need no manipulation and can be 
parsed for use. The packaging used for transmission of each of the MLS LAN 
Protocols is depicted in Figure 5. 
3.5 TCBE to TCB Extension Server Interaction. 
This section describes the uses of the TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol. Prior to 
use of the protocol both the TCBE and TCB Extension Server must be powered 
and in at least State [1] Idle. As previously mentioned, only the user through the 
use of the Secure Attention Key, can initiate the TCB-TCBE Connection 
Protocol. With the exception of the "UPDATE PCC" command, the TCBE will 
display the payload to the user for all datagrams received. If a datagram is_ 
received with a "Response" type of "RESPONSE WITHOUT ECHO", the TCBE 
-will wait for input from the user without echoing the input to the screen. User 
input can be interrupted at any time by the following actions: 
• PowerOff 
• Activation of a Secure Attention Key 
• Activation of the "Escape" key. 
3.5.1 TCBE State Options and Transitions 
The TCBE has the capability of generating only three types of TCB-TCBE 
Protocol Datagrams. They are as follows: 
• Secure Attention Request. The TCBE will generate and transmit a Secure 
Attention Request packet (as described in Section 3.4.1) for each use of the 
Secure Attention Key by the user, regardless of its current state. This action 
will transition the TCBE into State [3] (TP Processing) and initialize a 
Protected Communications Channel or "Trusted Path" to the TCB if one does 
not already exist. 
• Response. The TCBE will generate and transmit a Response Packet when 
the TCB Extension Server requires a response. The TCBE will remain in 
State [3] (TP Processing) and wait for input from the user. It will then 
generate and transmit a Response Datagram packet (as described in 
Section 3.4.1). 
• PCC Updated. The TCBE will generate and transmit a PCC Updated 
packet (as described in Section 3.4.1) following the successful creation or 
update of the Protected Communications Channel Security Policy 
Database from the information provided by the TCB Extension Server. 
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To lower layers 
Figure 5. MLS LAN Protocol Datagram Packaging 
a. TCBE Options and transitions in State [0] (Power OfD: 
The only option for a client to transition out of State [0] is to apply power to 
the system. 
b. TCBE Options and transitions in State [11 (Idle): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCBE in this state. 
• Unprotected Mode: The selection of Unprotected Mode will 
transition the TCBE to State [2] (Unprotected Operations). (This will 
be developed as part of Future work) 
• SAK: The activation of the SAK will transition the TCBE to State [3] 
(Trusted Processing). A Secure Attention Request packet will be 
transmitted. 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] (Power Off). 
c. TCBE Options and transitions in State [2] (Unprotected Operations): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCBE in 'this state. 
• Unprotected operations in the client workstation environment. (This 
will be developed as part of Future work) 
• SAK: The activation of the SAK will transition the TCBE to State [3] 
(Trusted Processing). A Secure Attention Request packet will be 
transmitted. 
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• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] (Power Off). 
d. TCBE Options and transitions in State [3] (Trusted Processing): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCBE in this state. 
• NOOP: The receipt of a NOOP command will cause the TCBE to 
display the received payload to the user. The nature of the payload is 
used to provide the user with an interactive login and session 
negotiation with the TCB. The TCB Extension Server will use this 
command field value to pass information directly to the user without 
TCBE intervention, or interpretation. The TCBE will remain in State 
[3] (Trusted Processing). 
• Logout: The receipt of a LOGOUT command will transition the 
TCBE to State [1] (Idle). Any received payload will be displayed to 
the user. This command directs the TCBE to purge the existing 
Operating System and files from the workstation's memory and return 
to an "Idle" state. 
• Run: The receipt of a RUN command will cause the TCBE to purge 
the workstation's memory and transition to State [4] (Trusted Session) 
with a sanitized version of the Operating System. Any received 
payload will be displayed to the user. The TCB Extension Server will 
use this command field value to activate a session with the TCBE 
equipped client workstation. 
• Resume: The receipt of a RESUME command will transition the 
TCBE back to State [ 4] (Trusted Session) at the current session level. 
Any received payload will be displayed to the user. This command 
directs the TCBE to maintain the original version of the Operating 
System and return to the user's previous session configuration. The 
TCB Extension Server will use this command field value to re-activate 
a session with the TCBE equipped client workstation. 
• New: This command provides for a future capability in the MLS LAN. 
The "NEW" command is intended to allow the incorporation of an 
algorithm, which will determine if the client workstation's Operating 
System and memory need be purged. The algorithm will enable the 
TCB Extension Server to perform an evaluation of the user's current 
sensitivity level and the requested new sensitivity level. If the change 
in session level will cause a violation of the security policy through the 
use of the currently running operating system, the system will be 
purged through a RUN command. If the new session level does not 
violate the security policy, a NEW command could be used to change 
the session, but maintain the current operating system. This algorithm 
is left for future work. 
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• Disconnect: The receipt of a DISCONNECT command terminates the 
connection to the TCB Extension Server and returns the control of the 
client workstation to State [ 1] (Idle). Any received payload will be 
displayed to the user. This command directs the TCBE to terminate the 
client workstation's connection to the TCB. 
• SAK: The activation of the SAK will transition the TCBE to State [3] 
(Trusted Processing). A Secure Attention Request packet will be 
transmitted. 
• Update PCC: The receipt of a UPDATE PCC command will direct 
the TCBE to modify the TCBE Security Policy Database with the data 
contained in the payload. The TCBE will send a "PCC Updated" 
Response packet. 
• Escape: Future work. The use of an escape key will transition the 
TCBE to the state from which it entered State [3] (Trusted Processing). 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] (Power Oft). 
e. Options and transitions in State [4] (Trusted Session): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCBE in this state. 
• Trusted operations in the client workstation environment. 
• SAK: The activation of the SAK will transition the TCBE to State [3] 
(Trusted Processing). A Secure Attention Request packet will be 
transmitted. 
• Power Off: The removal of power t9 the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] (Power Off). 
• Disconnect: The receipt of a DISCONNECT command terminates the 
connection to the TCB Extension Server and returns the control of the 
client workstation to State [1] (Idle). Any received payload will be 
displayed to the user. This command directs the TCBE to terminate the 
client workstation's connection to the TCB. 
3.5.2 TCB Extension Server State Options and Transitions 
The TCB Extension Server has the capability of generating only three types of 
TCB-TCBE Protocol Datagrarns. They are as follows: 
• No Response. The TCB Extension Server will generate and transmit a 
No Response packet (as described in Section 3.4.2) for datagrarns 
when the TCB Extension Server does not require a response. The TCB 
Extension Server will use this response type for commands that are 
directive in nature, such as "RUN" or "LOGOUT" or informational in 
nature, such as "NOOP (No Operation Expected)". 
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• Response with Echo. The TCB Extension Server will generate and 
transmit a Response with Echo packet (as described in Section 3.4.2) 
for datagrams when the TCB Extension Server requires a response and 
there is no protection compromise if the user's response is echoed to 
the screen. The TCB Extension Server will use this response type for 
commands that require user input that is not of a private nature, such 
as "USERNAME" or "SESSION LEVEL CHANGE". 
• Response without Echo. The TCB Extension Server will generate 
and transmit a Response without Echo packet (as described in Section 
3.4.2) for datagrams when the TCB Extension Server requires a 
response and there is a possible protection compromise if the user's 
response is echoed to the screen. This response type will be entered 
when a response is expected from the TCBE and the TCB Extension 
Server does NOT allow the TCBE to display the user's response on the 
screen. 
a. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [0] (Power 
Off): 
The only option for the TCB Extension Server to transition out of State (0) is 
to apply power to the system. 
b. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [1] (Idle): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCB Extension Server in this state. 
• SAR: The receipt of a Secure Attention Request packet will transition 
the TCB Extension Server to State [2] (Connected}. 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the TCB Extension Server will 
transition the TCB Extension Server to State [0] (Power Off). 
c. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [2] 
(Connected): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCB Extension Server in this state. 
• SAR: The receipt of a Secure Attention Request packet will initiate the 
User I&A portion of this State. The TCB Extension Server will remain 
in State [2]. 
o User Identification and Authentication Processing: The TCB 
Extension Server will transmit a series of NOOP commands to 
request the user provide their usemame and password for login. 
The "Usemame" prompt will be delivered using a Response with 
Echo packet, while the "Password" prompt will be delivered using 
a Response without Echo packet. 
o Incorrect User Identification and Authentication: An incorrect 
User I&A will transition the TCB Extension Server to State [1] 
(Idle). A No Response packet will be transmitted to the TCBE 
containing the Command DISCONNECT. 
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o Correct User Identification and Authentication: A correct User 
I&A will transition the TCB Extension Server to State [3] (Logged 
In). 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCB Extension Server to State [0] (Power Off). 
d. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [3] (Logged 
In): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCB Extension Server in this state. Once the menu 
has been displayed to the user by the TCBE, there is no specific order that 
must apply to the user requests. The transition to State [3] (Logged In) will 
cause the TCB Extension Server to send to the TCBE a User Interface Menu 
as a payload in a Response with Echo packet using the NOOP command. The 
TCBE will display the packet payload to the user. This menu that is displayed 
provides a listing of selections, which can be used to perform trusted path 
operations. The TCB Extension Server will remain in State [3] (Logged In). 
Selections offered to the user will be: Session, Session Level Change, Group 
Change, Logout, and Run. 
• Session: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"SESSION" request, the TCB Extension Server will return the current 
session level information. The TCB Extension Server will remain in 
the current State. This information will be presented to the user via No 
Response packets using the NOOP command. 
• Set level (SL): Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"SESSION LEVEL CHANGE" request, the TCB Extension Server 
will enter an interactive exchange to determine the session level the 
user would like to use. The TCB Extension Server will remain in the 
current State. This information will be presented to the user via 
Response with Echo packets using the NOOP command. 
• Set Group (SG): Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"SET GROUP" request, the TCB Extension Server will enter an 
interactive exchange to determine the group that the user would like to 
use. The TCB Extension Server will remain in the current State. This 
information will be presented to the user via Response with Echo 
packets using the NOOP command. 
• Logout: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"LOGOUT" request, the TCB Extension Server will send a LOGOUT 
command to the TCBE. The TCB Extension Server will transition to 
State [ 1] (Idle). This command will be transmitted to the TCBE using 
a No Response packet. The payload of the packet may be empty or it 
may contain a "Logout complete" message. 
• Update PCC: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"RUN" request, the TCB Extension Server will update the TCBE 
Security Policy Database using the UPDATE PCC command. This 
command MUST be transmitted by the TCB Extension Server prior to 
issuing a "RUN" command. The information for the Security Policy 
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Database will be placed in the payload of a Response packet. The 
format of the information in the SPD payload will be developed as part 
of a future effort. Following successful update of the TCBE SPD, the 
TCBE will transmit a "PCC UPDATED" packet. If this packet is not 
received from the TCBE, the TCB Extension Server connection will 
"time out", disconnecting the TCBE-equipped workstation from the 
MLS LAN and transition to State [1] (Idle). Otherwise, the TCB 
Extension Server will remain in the current State. 
The incorporation of a "sensitivity algorithm (as described in Section 
3.5.l.d) may require the inclusion of an associated "Ready" State for 
the TCB Extension Server. This "Ready" state would allow the TCB 
Extension Server to decide whether the TCBE-equipped workstation's 
memory needs to be purged. The development of this new state is left 
to future work. 
• Run: Upon the receipt of a "PCC UPDATED" packet, the TCB 
Extension Server will send a RUN command to the TCBE. The TCB 
Extension Server will transition to State [4] (Running). This command 
will be transmitted to the TCBE using a No Response packet. 
• SAR: The receipt of a Secure Attention Request packet will cause the 
TCB Extension Server to send the User Interface Menu Command 
Options and the TCB Extension Server will remain in the current 
State. These options will be presented to the user via Response with 
Echo packets using the NOOP command. 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [OJ (Power Off). 
e. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [ 4] 
(Running): 
• The TCB Extension Server will remain active, waiting for a Secure 
Attention Request packet from the client workstation environment. 
• SAR: The receipt of a Secure Attention Request packet will transition 
the TCB Extension Server to State [5] (Trusted Session Processing). 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] (Power Off). 
f. TCB Extension Server Command Options and transitions in State [5] (Trusted 
Session Processing): 
The transition to State [5] (Trusted Session Processing) will cause the TCB 
Extension Server to send to the TCBE an updated User Interface Menu as a 
payload in a Response with Echo packet using the NOOP command. The 
TCBE will display the packet payload to the user. This menu that is displayed 
is essentially the same as the provided in State [3] (Logged In), except the 
user is now provided the additional selection of "Resume". The TCB 
Extension Server will remain in State [5] (Trusted Session Processing). 
• Session: The receipt of a response packet containing a "SESSION" 
request will be handled as described in Section 3.5.2.d. 
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• Set level (SL): The receipt of a response packet containing a 
"SESSION LEVEL CHANGE" request will be handled as described 
in Section 3.5.2.d. 
• Set Group (SG): The receipt of a response packet containing a "SET 
GROUP" request will be handled as described in Section 3.5.2.d. 
• Logout: The receipt of a response packet containing a "LOGOUT" 
request will be handled as described in Section 3.5.2.d. 
• Update PCC: This command will function as described in Section 
3.5.2.d. 
• Run: This command will function as described in Section 3.5.2.d. 
• Resume: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"RESUME" request, the TCB Extension Server will send a RESUME 
command to the TCBE. The TCB Extension Server will transition to 
State [4] Running. This command will be transmitted to the TCBE 
using a No Response packet. The payload of the packet may be empty 
or it may contain a "Resume completed" message. This command 
should NOT be available following the user's change of session level 
or group. 
• SAR: The receipt of a Secure Attention Request packet will be 
handled as described in Section 3.5.2.d. 
• Power Off: The removal of power to the workstation will transition 
the TCBE to State [0] Power Off. 
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4. Session Status Protocol 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the successful session negotiation by a user into the MLS LAN, the 
TCB Extension Server must create a session database entry through the Session 
Database Server (SDS) that uniquely defines information such as who the user is, 
from which TCBE-equipped workstation he logged in, and the sensitivity and 
integrity levels assigned to the current session. The integrity of the Session Status 
Database (SSD) is critical to the assurance of the overall LAN and therefore the 
ability to manipulate (read/write) its data must be constrained. The Session Status 
Protocol is provided as a method for the TCB Extension Server, acting as the only 
TCB entity with both read and write access to the SDS, to modify the contents of 
the SSD. This protocol is also used by other TCB entities to verify the session 
_status of MLS LAN users. TCB entities, other than the TCB Extension Server are 
limited to "read only" access. Protection against replay and spoofing is provided 
by the underlying Protected Communications Channel. The protocol will be 
described in terms of the TCB Extension Server state transitions, SDS state 
transitions, and "other TCB Entities" requests. 
4.2 TCB Extension Server States. 
The states from which the TCB Extension Server will use the Session Status 
Protocol are described in Section 3.3. While other entities can use this protocol to 
query the SDS, the state transitions are more germane to the creation, 
modification and deletion of database entries. This protocol does not constitute a 
transition for the TCB Extension Server. 
4.3 Session Database Server States. 
The Session Database Server uses input commands received from the TCB 
Extension Server to modify the status of the Session Status Database, however, 
the configuration of the Session Database Server is not relevant to this protocol. 
4.4 Session Status Protocol Datagram Format 
There are two defined datagram formats for the Session Status protocol. The first, 
shown in Figure 6, is the "Request" packet used to convey information from the TCB 
Extension Server or other TCB entities to the Session Database Server (SDS). The 
second, shown in Figure 7, is the "Response" packet provided to enable the Session 
Database Server to respond to the TCB entities' request. 
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0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCB IDENTICATION HEADER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I USER SESSION ID I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
IVersioniCornmandl Payload I RESERVED I Number Length 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I PAYLOAD I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 6. TCB Extension Server to SDS Request Datagram Format 
4.4.1 TCB Entity to SDS Datagram Field Descriptions 
The following subsections define the fields that comprise the TCB entity-to-SDS 
"Request" datagram as depicted in Figure 7. The TCB Identifier, Version Number, 
Payload Length and Reserved fields are the same as described in Section 3.4.1 and will 
not be repeated here. All fields in the datagram, however are mandatory, i.e., they are 
always present in the Session Status Protocol. 
a. User Session Identification. 
The User Session Identification is a 32-bit field that uniquely identifies the 
TCBE equipped workstation.that has established a session on the MLS LAN. 
This field is used to identify the specific record in the SSD. Version 1 uses the 
TCBE ID as the User Session ID, however, future versions may incorporate a 
different ID value. 
b. Command. 
This field is a 4-bit value that identifies the type of command that is being 
passed to the SDS. The value of this field is chosen from the listing below. 16 
command types possible, however, in the current version only 4 are defined. 
• Value 0 -- Create 
• Value ]-Modify 
• Value 2- List 
• Value 3- Delete 
c. Payload: 
This is a variable length field that contains the user and session information to 
be added by the SDS. The payload will be organized into (attribute name I 
input data) pairs such as: "Current Session Level: Secret". Available attributes 
are as follows: 
• USER ID: The user's unique "Usemame". 
• CURRENT SESSION LEVEL: The current negotiated session 
sensitivity level. 
• CURRENT INTEGRITY LEVEL: The current negotiated session 
integrity level. 
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• CURRENT GROUP SETTING: The current negotiated group or role. 
• RUNNING: A flag that denotes whether or not the current session is 
started. 
4.4.2 Session Database Server to TCB Entity Datagram Field Descriptions 
The following subsections define the fields that comprise the SDS-to-TCB Entity 
"Response" datagram as depicted in Figure 8. The TCB Identifier, Version 
Number, Payload Length and Reserved fields are the same as described in Section 
3.4.1 and will not be repeated here. All fields in the datagram, however are 
mandatory, i.e., they are always present in the Session Status Protocol. 
0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCB IDENTICATION HEADER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I USER SESSION ID I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
I
VersioniResponse I Payload I RESERVED I 
Number Type I Length I I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I PAYLOAD I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 7. SDS to TCB Extension Server Response Datagram Format 
a. User Session Identification. 
This field has the same attributes as described in Section 4.4.1.b. 
b. Response. 
This is a field is a 4-bit value that identifies the type of response that is being 
passed to the TCB Entity. The value of this field is chosen from a listing of 
response types defined in the latest version of the Session Status Protocol. 16 
response types are possible, however, in the current version only 3 are 
defined. For Version 1, the response type values are as follows: 
• Value 0 -- ACK Response 
• Value I - NAK Response 
• Value 2 -Payload Response 
c. Payload: 
• This is a variable length field that contains the user and session 
information to be passed to the TCB Entity. The payload will be 
organized the same as in Section 4.4.1.g with the addition of the 
following payload type. 
• ERROR: This will be an informative message describing the reason 
for failure. 
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4.4.3 Datagram Packaging. 
The TCB Entity and SDS will generate one of the request types of Session Status 
datagram packets described in Sections 4.4.1 or 4.4.2 for their secure operation 
communications. The datagram will be created by either the TCB Entity or the 
SDS and passed to the lower layers protocols for transmission to the other entity. 
Since the protocol is created using fixed fields, the value in these datagram fields 
need no manipulation and can be parsed for use. The packaging used for 
transmission of the Session Status Protocol is the same as depicted in Figure 5. 
4.5 SDS to TCB Extension Server Interaction. 
This section describes the uses of the Session Status protocol between the SDS 
and the TCB Extension Server. The use of the "List" Request, however, could be 
used similarly from any TCB Entity. Prior to use of the protocol both the TCB 
Entity and Session Status Database must be powered and in at least State [1] Idle. 
The loss of communications between the TCB Extension Server and the SDS 
could allow unwarranted access to the MLS LAN. To prevent an insecurity, the 
MLS LAN requires some control mechanism that could prevent new connections 
to the MLS LAN and its services in this event. The development of this 
mechanism is left to future work. 
4.5.1 TCB Entity State Options 
All TCB entities, such as the Secure Session Server, have the capability to 
generate only one type of Session Status Protocol datagram. It is a Request 
datagram as described in Section 4.4.1, however, the only available type of 
request is the "List" command. The transmission of this datagram does not 
constitute a State transition for any TCB entity. 
The function of the LIST command datagram of the Session Status Protocol for 
TCB entities other than the TCB Extension Server is as follows: 
• List: Upon Receipt of a request for Network Application Services, a 
TCB Entity will generate and transmit a LIST Request packet placing the 
requestor's TCBE ID in the User Session Identification field. This 
command directs the SDS to locate and return the attribute values 
contained in the entry found under the listing of the User Session 
Identification number. The response will determine whether the user is 
currently logged in. If the user is logged in, the TCB entity will continue 
with the connection process as described in Section 5.3.1f, however, a 
NAK response is received from the SDS the TCB entity will terminate the 
Application Protocol connection to the requesting TCBE-equipped 
workstation. 
The TCB Extension Server has the capability of generating only one type of 
Session Status Protocol datagram. It is also a Request datagram as described in 
Section 4.4.l.The TCB Extension Server will generate and transmit a Request 
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packet to request the creation or modification of records. This action can only be 
taken from three states: State [2] (Connected), State [3] (Logged In), and State [5] 
(Trusted Session Processing). The transmission of this datagram does not 
constitute a transition for the TCB Extension Server. 
a. TCB Extension Server Options in State [2] (Connected). 
• List: Upon the receipt of a SAR packet containing the TCBE ID the 
TCB Extension Server will issue a "LIST" command to see if the SDS has 
created a previous entry for the current user. This command directs the 
SDS to locate and return the attribute values contained in the entry found 
under the listing of the User Session Identification number. The response 
will determine whether the user is currently logged in. If the user is logged 
in, the TCB Extension Server will transition to State [3] (Logged in). If a 
NAK response is received from the SDS, the TCB Extension Server will 
continue with the "User I&A session as described in Section 3.5.2.c. and 
remain in the current State. 
• Create: Once the TCB Extension Server has verified the User I&A (as 
described in Section 3.5.2.c, it will issue a "CREATE" command to 
instantiate a record for the new user. This command must be completed 
prior to the TCB Extension Server completing the successful User I&A 
which enables the transition to State [3] (Logged in). This command tells 
the SDS to create a new entry in the database. The TCB Extension Server 
will use this payload field value to pass the user and session information to 
the SDS. 
b. TCB Extension Server Command Options in State [3] (Logged Jnl: 
• List: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a "SESSION" 
request, the TCB Extension Server will issue a "LIST" command to 
retrieve the attribute values contained in the session database entry found 
under the listing of the User Session Identification number. The TCB 
Extension Server will pass this information to the TCBE as described in 
Section 3.5.2.d (Session). The TCB Extension Server will remain in State 
[3] (Logged in). 
• Create: This command cannot be issued from this State. 
• Modify: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a "RUN" 
request, from the TCBE, the TCB Extension Server will issue a 
"MODIFY" command requesting the SDS to update the current session 
information to the values negotiated during the Trusted Path Processing. 
This use of this protocol does not constitute a transition. The SDS will use 
this command field to change the value of one or more of the attributes of 
a current database entry. 
• Delete: Upon the receipt of a response packet containing a 
"LOGOUT" request, or the issuance of a "DISCONNECT", the TCB 
Extension Server will issue a "DELETE" command to request the SDS 
remove the User's current session record. The use of this protocol does not 
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constitute a transition. This command directs the SDS to delete a current 
entry in the database. 
c. TCB Extension Server Command Options in State [51 (Trusted Session 
Processing): 
• List: The receipt of a response packet containing a "SESSION" 
request will be handled as described in Section 4.5.l.b. 
• Create: This command cannot be issued from this State. 
• Modify: The receipt of a response packet containing a "RUN" request 
will be handled as described in Section 4.5.l.b. 
• Delete: The receipt of a response packet containing a "LOGOUT" 
request will be handled as described in Section 4.5.l.b. 
4.5.2 Session Database Server Options 
The Session Database Server has the capability of generating only two types of 
Session Status Protocol datagrams. They are as follows: 
• ACK Response. The Session Database Server will generate and 
transmit an ACK Response packet for Request datagrams when the TCB 
Entity requires only a response determining success. The SDS will use this 
response type for commands that are directive in nature, such as 
"CREATE", "MODJFY" and "DELETE". The payload for an ACK 
RESPONSE packet will contain success verification information for the 
TCB Extension Server. 
• NAK Response. The Session Database Server will generate and 
transmit a NAK Response packet for Request datagrams when the TCB 
Entity requires determination of failure. The SDS will use this response 
type for commands such as "CREATE", "LIST", "MODIFY" and 
"DELETE". The payload for a NAK RESPONSE packet may contain 
information for the TCB Entity concerning the reason for the failure. 
• Payload Response. The Session Database Server will generate and 
transmit a Payload Response packet for Request datagrams when the TCB 
Entity requires the information contained in the record. This response type 
will be entered when the SDS has been issued a command that requires the 
return of information contained in a database entry. 
4.5.3 Session Database Server Response 
The Session Database Server will respond to a TCB Entities' commands in the 
following manner: 
• Create: The receipt of a "CREATE" Request packet will direct the 
SDS to create a record under the index coinciding with the User Session 
Identification Field received in the request packet. The SDS will generate 
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and transmit the outcome of the operation to the TCB Extension Server 
using an ACK or NAK Response packet. 
• Modify: The receipt of a "MODIFY" Request will direct the SDS to 
update the attributes associated with the User Session Identification to the 
values contained in the payload. The SDS will generate and transmit the 
outcome of the operation to the TCB Extension Server using an ACK or 
NAK Response packet. 
• Delete: The receipt of a "DELETE" Request will direct the SDS to 
remove the record associated with the User Session Identification 
contained in the User Session ID datagram field. The SDS will generate 
and transmit the outcome of the operation to the TCB Extension Server 
using an ACK or NAK Response packet. 
• List: The receipt of a "LIST" Command will direct the SDS to 
transmit the values of the attributes associated with the User Session 
Identification contained in the User Session ID datagram field. The SDS 
will generate and transmit the information to the requesting TCB entity 
using a Payload Response packet. If the result of the search is a failure, the 
SDS will generate and transmit a NAK Response packet. 
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5. TCBE-to-Session Server Connection Protocol 
5.1 Introduction 
The MLS LAN is intended to provide access to multiple Application Layer 
Protocols such as FfP, HTTP, or IMAP. For Version 1, these application services 
are only accessible to users who have successfully logged in to the MLS LAN and 
established a Session within the TCB. The TCBE-to-Session Server Connection 
Protocol is provided as a method for the TCBE to pass a unique identifier to the 
Secure Session Server (SSS) in order to check with the Session Database Server 
(SDS) for the user's session information. The MLS LAN uses the TCBE 
identification number as this identifier. The design of this protocol, however, will 
allow alternate future data, such as a unique session token, to be inserted adding 
flexibility to the MLS LAN. Once the user's information is returned from the 
~ps, the Session Server will establish the proper session level connectivity to the 
appropriate MLS LAN Application Protocol Server (APS) as described in 
[ShifOO]. If, however, the user is not found by the SDS, the connection to the 
Application Protocol Server will be terminated. 
In the future, the MLS LAN should allow users to access these services through 
an anonymous or "untrusted" connection, but this will not affect the applicability 
of this protocol. 
5.2 TCBE States. 
The states from which the TCBE will use the Session Status Protocol are 
described in Section 3.2. 
5.3 Secure Session Server States. 
A Secure Session Server is created for each higher layer application protocol 
supported by the MLS LAN. Its responsibility is to accept and validate requests 
for access to the particular protocol. Following the acceptance of a request for 
service from a TCBE, the SSS will use the TCBE ID to verify that a session has 
been established. Connections from TCBEs with valid sessions will be passed to a 
"child" session server, while connections from TCBEs without sessions will be 
terminated. The SSS uses the TCPIIP Application Protocol connection request 
packet from the TCBE equipped client workstation to change its configuration. 
The configuration of the Secure Session Server is not relevant to the use of this 
protocol. 
5.4 TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol Datagram Format 
The datagram format for the protocol is shown in Figure 8. 
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0 1 2 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCB IDENTICATION HEADER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ I TCBE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
IVersionl Payload I RESERVED I Number Length 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
I PAYLOAD I 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 8. TCBE-to-Session Server Datagram Format 
5.4.1 TCB Extension to SSS Datagram Field Descriptions 
The following subsections define the fields that comprise the TCBE to SSS 
"Identification" datagram. The TCB Identifier, Version Number, Payload Length 
and Reserved fields are the same as described in Section 3.4.1 and will not be 
repeated here. All fields in the datagram, however are mandatory, i.e., they are 
always present in the TCBE-to-Session Server Connection Protocol. . 
a. TCBE Identification Number Field. 
This is a 32-bit value that identifies the TCB Entity that created the packet. 
This will be used by the Secure Session Server to facilitate Hardware 
Identification and Authentication. 
b. Payload Field. 
This is a variable length field that contains the information to be sent to the 
SSS from the TCBE. This field is empty in Version 1 of the protocol. 
5.4.2 Application Protocol Service Request Packet 
Each application protocol client residing on the client workstation can generate an 
Application Protocol Service Connection Request packet. This is a generic 
TCPIIP Client-Server packet. The TCBE forwards this request to the SSS, which 
hosts the particular protocol without modification. 
5.4.3 TCBE-to-Session Server Datagram Packaging. 
The TCBE will generate a TCBE-to-Session Server Identification datagram for all 
APS requests. The Identification datagram will be created by TCBE Extension 
and passed to the lower layers protocols for transmission to the other entity. Since 
the protocol is created using fixed fields, the value in these datagram fields needs 
no manipulation and can be parsed for use. The packaging used for transmission 
of the TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol is the same as depicted in Figure 5. 
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5.5 TCBE to Secure Session Server Interaction. 
This section describes the uses of the protocol. Prior to use of the protocol both 
the TCBE and Session Server must be powered and in at least State [1] (Idle). 
5.5.1 TCBE State Options 
The TCBE has the capability of generating only one type of TCBE-to-Session , 
Server Connection datagram. It is designed as follows: 
• Identification. The TCBE will generate and transmit an Identification 
packet following each application protocol request received from the 
client workstation. In the current version of this protocol, this action 
can only be taken from one state: State [4] (Trusted Session), however 
future versions may allow for this protocol in State [2] (Unprotected 
Operations). The use of this protocol does not constitute state 
transitions for the TCBE. 
a. TCBE Options in State [21 (Unprotected Operations): 
• This protocol is not available in this State, however, it may be used in 
future upgrades of the MLS LAN Unprotected Operations. 
b. TCBE Command Options in State (4) (Trusted Operations): 
The following listing describes the allowable inputs and the appropriate 
actions to be taken by the TCBE in this state. 
• Identification Packet Upon the receipt of a "Application Protocol 
Service Connection Request" from a higher layer protocol client 
residing on the client workstation, the TCBE will generate and 
transmit an Identification packet to the Secure Session Server which 
hosts that protocol. 
5.5.2 Secure Session Server Options 
The Secure Session Server does not respond directly to the TCBE using this 
protocol. The Secure Session Server uses the information contained in the TCBE-
to-Session Server datagram to generate and transmit a "LIST" command to the 
Session Database Server as described in Section 4.5.1. This command will verify 
the user's current session information. Once this information has been verified, 
the Secure Session Server will continue with the Application Protocol Server 
operations as described in [ShifOO]. If the user is not logged in, the Secure Session 
Server will simply terminate the connection to the requesting application. If the 
Identification datagram is not received, the "LIST" command cannot be 
transmitted and the Secure Session Server cannot connect the Application 
Protocol client request to the Application Protocol Server. This action will, in 
turn cause a time out in the Application Layer requiring a retry. 
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